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The Solicitor General and Intragovernmental Conflict 
According to one former occupant of the office, "[t]he Solicitor 
General has no master to serve except his country."1 In serving that 
master, the Solicitor General has broad authority to formulate the 
legal position of the United States in particular matters, 2 and that 
power has far-reaching effects. Through his authority to deny fed-
eral agencies and departments access to the Supreme Court, 3 the 
Solicitor General may significantly influence agency and depart-
ment policy. In acting as the government's advocate before the 
Supreme Court, 4 in deciding whether to appeal cases unsuccessfully 
litigated by the Justice Department/' and in authoring briefs for the 
United States as amicus curiae in appellate cases, 0 the importance 
of the Solicitor General's role is obvious. 
1. F. BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 98 (1962). 
2. The Office of the Solicitor General was established by the Judiciary Act of 
1870, ch. 150, § 2, 16 Stat. 162. The current statutory provisions defining the 
powers and duties of the Solicitor General are found in 28 U.S.C. §§ 505, 517, 
518 (1970). The Attorney General's codification of the Solicitor General's duties 
is set out in 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.20, 0.21, 0.163 (1977). 
3. See Note, Government Litigation in the Supreme Court: The Roles of the 
Solicitor General, 78 YALE LJ. 1442, 1443 (1969). The statutory basis of this 
power is somewhat unclear. The Solicitor General claims that his authority to regu-
late agency access to the Court is implied by the power to supervise and conduct all 
governmental litigation granted to the Attorney General by 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519 
(1970). See Note, supra at 1452 n.49. This authority was recognized in Port 
of New York Auth. v. Baker, Watts & Co., 392 F.2d 497, 498 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 
1968) (Solicitor General authorized to disallow appeal of Comptroller of the Cur-
rency). 
Certain federal agencies have express statutory authority to proceed independent 
of the Solicitor General. The ICC and the FTC, for example, are authorized to 
conduct their own litigation and to file petitions for certiorari. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 
53, 56 (1976) (FTC); 28 U.S.C. § 2323 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (ICC). The 
Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2350 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), authorizes the FCC, 
the Federal Maritime Commission, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Mari-
time Administration to petition for certiorari in a suit brought to contest an admin-
istrative order irrespective of the Solicitor General's approval. Despite this statutory 
authority, the FCC and the Secretary of Agriculture regularly clear their petitions 
through the Solicitor General. See Note, supra at 1451. 
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 518(a) (1970). In the 1975 Term, the Government partici-
pated, eith'er as a party or through the submission of amicus curiae briefs, in 121 
of the 179 cases in which the Court heard argument. The government participated 
in 175 cases decided on the merits, and the Court decided in favor of the govern-
ment's position in 139 of them. [1976] ATTY. GEN, ANN. REP. 34. 
5. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(b) (1977). As a practical matter, primary responsi-
bility for the decision whether to appeal lies with the appellate sections of the Justice 
Department, since the Solicitor General accepts their recommendations in 90% of 
the cases. See Note, supra note 3, at 1444 n.10. 
6. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(c) (1977). Of course, not all disputes among agencies 
arising out of government litigation reach the Solicitor General. Ordinarily, con-
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Traditionally the Supreme Court has shown great respect for the 
views of the Solicitor General. Because his position carries extra-
ordinary responsibility and identifies him as an individual of proven 
legal abilities, the Solicitor General is a more formidable advocate 
in ithe Court than the typical attorney, . who appears there rarely 
and only on behalf of private interests. In his frequent appearances 
before the Court, the Solicitor General can significantly affect the 
development -of the law. And because government decisionmakers 
recognize that they ultimately may either need his support or be 
seriously disadvantaged in defending their position in the Supreme 
Court, the Solicitor General may also exercise considerable influence 
on government policy. 
"The United States" is hardly a sharply defined entity. The 
federal government often speaks in many voices, with several of its 
instrumentalities advocating inconsistent positions. Furthermore, 
the position of the government, even where unambiguous, may not 
reflect the public interest. Thus, in representing "the United 
States," the Solicitor General may find it diliicult to identify his 
"client." In order to formulate the position of the United States, 
the Solicitor General may have to give priority to the views of one 
among several competing government agencies, and he may have 
to decide whether his obligation to the public overrides his responsi-
bility to the government. 
This Note considers the way in which the Solicitor General has 
resolved-and should resolve-such ambiguities in his role as advo-
cate for the United States. First, the Note examines the accommoda-
tion of interests represented by the Solicitor General's responses to 
discordant obligations. Second, it analyzes the common law and 
statutory sources of the Solicitor General's responsibilities. Finally, 
the proper role of the Solicitor General is assessed, giving due 
consideration to his position .as mediator among interest groups 
within the government and to the institutional constraints to which 
he is subject. 
I. TuE ROLES OF THE SoLICITOR GENERAL 
As a first step toward an understanding of the considerations 
governing how the Solicitor General should resolve conflicts in his 
responsibilities, it is helpful to identify the roles manifested by 
past actions of the Solicitor General. There are three identifiable, 
although ~ot necessarily mutually exclusive, 7 roles played- by the 
flicts among government attorneys either are resolved within the Justice Department 
or, if other agencies are involved, are mediated by the Department's attorneys. Stem, 
"Inconsistency" in Government Litigation, 64 HARV. L. REV'. 759, 769 (1951). 
7. In fact, it will be shown that these roles may overlap to a considerable extent. 
See text following note 29 infra. 
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Solicitor General: he may advocate on behalf of the "public inter-
est," the federal government as an entity, or the Executive. 
A. The Solicitor General as Protector of the Public Interest 
The Solicitor General is often -described as an advocate charged 
with protecting the public's interest in the integrity of the Constitu-
tion and our legal system. 8 One way in which the Solicitor General 
fulfills this role is by participating as an amicus on behalf of the 
United States in cases of major constitutional import.0 The Solicitor 
General has used this position to raise issues overlooked by the 
parties and to suggest an analysis that enables the Court to reach a re-
sult in the best interest of the public.10 Thus, through the amicus 
brief, the experienced Solicitor General can apply his expertise in 
constitutional litigation and his familiarity with the predilections of 
the Justices11 to exercise considerable influence over the develop-
ment of the law.12 
Another way in which the Solicitor General represents the public 
interest is through his management of government litigation in the 
Supreme Court. For example, he has joined in challenges to admin-
8. See, e.g., Cox, The Government in the Supreme Court, 44 Cm. B. REC. 221, 
222 (1963); Sobeloff, Attorney for the Government: The Work of the Solicitor 
General's Office, 41 A.B.A.J. 229, 22!> (1955). 
9. The participation by the Attorney General and the Solicitor General for the 
United States as amicus curiae in constitutional litigation has an illustrious history 
dating from the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt. See Krislov, The Role of the 
Attorney General as Amicus Curiae, in L. HUSTON, A. MILLER, S. KRISLOV & R, 
DIXON, JR., THE ROLE OF THE ATIORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 71, 
80 (1968) (hereinafter cited as ROLE OF THE ATIORNEY GENERAL), This amicus 
practice recently has been concentrated on cases involving racial discrimination and 
legislative apportionment. Id.; Note, supra note 3, at 1479. 
The Supreme Court frequently invites the Solicitor General to submit an amicus 
brief in constitutional litigation in which the federal government is not a party. 
See Note, supra note 3, at 1480. The Supreme Court's rules governing amicus par-
ticipation give special dispensations to the Solicitor General. He may submit a brief 
for the United States as amicus curiae without the consent of the parties or the spe-
cial leave of the Court that is required of private amici, SUP. CT. R. 42(4), and he 
is also exempt from the Court's usual disfavor of requests by an amicus for per-
mission to present oral argument without consent of the appropriate party. See 
SUP. Cr. R. 44(7). 
10. For example, he has suggested means of avoiding a constitutional decision 
and has proposed compromise solutions likely to appeal to a majority of the Court. 
See Note, supra note 3, at 1480. 
11. See id. 
12. See Cox, supra note 8, at 226. The importance of the Solicitor General's 
reading of the Constitution is suggested by the concern of several senators who 
questioned Solicitor General-designate Robert Bork on whether he would argue for 
the "one man-one vote" rule, which the Solicitor General had consistently and strenu-
ously advocated in the 1960s. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Solicitor Ge11-
eral, Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Bork Hearings]. 
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istrative agency13 rulings by calling attention either to an agency's 
failure to comply with standards of administrative procedure or to 
its incorrect application of a controlling statute.14 Similarly, in the 
administration of criminal litigation, the Solicitor General has gone 
so far as to "confess error" by pointing out suspect practices of gov-
ernmental officials in order to obtain reversals of convictions based 
on flawed prosecutions.15 
Although the Solicitor General enjoys considerable autonomy in 
appraising the best interests of the public when he acts as an inde-
pendent advocate devoted to proper administration of the laws, an 
important limitation on this role must be borne in mind. At all 
times, the Solicitor General is vulnerable to peremptory dismissal by 
the President, 16 and, as Justice Sutherland once observed, "[I]t is 
quite evident that one who holds his office only during the pleasure 
of another, cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of in-
dependence against the latter's will."17 Accordingly, one might ex-
pect that the Solicitor General performs his responsibilities as an 
agent of the President. In fact, however, .the Solicitor General 
has established a recognized degree of autonomy. One of the criti-
cal issues raised in the ensuing discussion is the proper scope of this 
independence from executive control. 
B. The Solicitor General as Attorney for the Government 
The second role of the Solicitor General is that of attorney for 
the federal government. The Solicitor General fulfills this role 
when he acts primarily to promote government interests. For ex-
ample, by selectively authorizing the government's petitions for 
13. The term "agency" is used in this Note as it is defined in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 451 (1970): "The term 'agency' includes any department, independent establish-
ment, commission, administration, authority, board or bureau of the United States 
or any corporation in which the United States has a proprietary interest, unless 
the context shows that such term was intended to be used in a more limited sense." 
14. See Note, supra note 3, at 1461-64. In Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 
(1955), the Solicitor General refused to defend the Civil Service Commission in 
a suit contesting dismissal from government service on grounds of suspected dis-
loyalty. See Lewis, Our Extraordinary Solicitor General, THE REPOR'I'.ER, May 5, 
1955, at 27. 
15. See Note, Confession of Error by the Solicitor General, 14 MICH, L. REV. 
1067, 1069-70 (1976). 
16. 28 U.S.C. § 501 (1970) provides that the Department of Justice is part 
of the executive branch of the government. The Solicitor General is appointed 
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 28 U.S.C. § 505 (1970). 
The President's power to remove the Solicitor General at his discretion follows from 
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (Senate has no authority to check 
P.resident's constitutional power to remove any executive officer appointed by him 
with advice and consent of Senate). See text at notes 163-72 infra. 
17. Humphrey's Exr. v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935). However, 
some commentators have minimized the influence of the President over the Solicitor 
General. See, e.g., Note, supra note 3, at 1480-81. 
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certiorari, the Solicitor General directs the attention of the Court 
toward those cases raising issues of the broadest or most immediate 
significance to the government.18 His control over the filing of 
appeals and his responsibility for shaping the government's argu-
ment on the merits also allow him to avert conflicting judicial de-
cisions that might result if the government adopted inconsistent 
positions in related cases.19 Finally, the Office of the Solicitor Gen-
eral renders more effective advocacy than its governmental clients 
could produce on their own, not simply because it is staffed by some 
of the ablest of the government's lawyers, but also because it does 
not suffer from the parochialism that typically afflicts governmental 
agencies. 20 
As attorney for the government, the Solicitor General is guided 
not only by the concerp.s of the "political" departments of the govern-
ment but also by those of the judiciary. Solicitude for the Court 
is a common motif in analyses of the office by former Solicitors Gen-
eral. 21 Archibald Cox has referred to the "sense of loyalty to the 
Court" that tempers the advocate's zealousness. 22 Rather than argue 
for a sweeping decision most favorable to the immediate interests 
of the government, for example, the Solicitor General may seek a 
narrower ruling that more closely follows the Court's prior deci-
sions. 28 The Solicitor General also helps ease the Court's caseload 
by screening the government's petitions for certiorari. 24 
18. See Note, supra note 3, at 1456-57; note 24 infra and accompanying text. 
19. See Stem, The Solicitor General's Office and Administrative Agency Litiga-
tion, 46 A.B.A.J. 154, 217 (1960). United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 (1949), 
is a striking example of the inconsistency that can take place on the part of the 
government. The go_vernment, which sought reparation of overcharges by railroads 
during the war, successfully contended that an ICC order denying reparations was 
appealable despite the fact that in three previous cases and in a case argued simul-
taneously in another district, the Solicitor General or other Justice Department attor-
neys had defended the doctrine that such orders were not appealable. 337 U.S. at 
445-46 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
20. Miller, The Attorney General as the President's Lawyer, in ROLE OF THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 9, at 64-65; Stern, supra note 6, at 759-60. Cf. 
Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 764 n.9 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring): 
The various Governmental agencies are apt to see decisions adverse to them 
from the point of view of their limited preoccupation and too often are eager 
to seek review from adverse decisions which should stop with the lower courts. 
The Solicitor General, however, must take a comprehensive view in determining 
when certiorari should be sought. 
21. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 8, at 222-23; Sobeloff, supra note 8, at 230. 
22. Cox, supra note 8, at 222-23. 
23. Of course, tactical considerations may also dictate the need for such judicious 
advocacy. 
24. See Note, supra note 3, at 1454. See also Fahy, The Office of the Solicitor 
General, 28 A.B.A.J. 20, 21 (1942). The Solicitor General generally selects the 
cases for which a petition is filed by applying the criteria apparently used by the 
Court to determine whether to grant certiorari. See Note, supra note 3, at 1454. 
See also Sobeloff, supra note 8, at 231. The perceptiveness of the Solicitor General 
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C. The Solicitor General as Attorney for the Executive 
The third and narrowest role of the Solicitor General is that of 
attorney for the Executive. The Solicitor · General has become in-
volved in several disputes between Congress and the Executive, 
usually when the former has attempted to impose constraints upon 
the powers of the President. In these cases the Solicitor General 
invariably advocates on behalf of the Executive. For example, he 
defended executive interests in a case involving a congressman's im-
munity from federal grand jury questioning. 25 He has also contested 
attempts by Congress to limit presidential powers to appoint and re-
move officers26 and to veto legislation. 27 The Solicitor General is 
not single-minded in his devotion to the Executive, 28 but his con-
and the Court's confidence in his judgment are suggested by the vastly greater success 
of govenµnent petitions over those of private litigants. During the 1975 Term, 
for example, the Court granted certiorari for 80% of the petitions filed or supported 
by the government and for only 5% of all other petitions. [1976] ATTY. GEN. ANN. 
REP. 31. 
25. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972). 
26. See, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); Humphrey's Exr. 
v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Solicitor General represented executive 
interests in contesting congressional authority to appoint members of commission 
exercising executive powers). 
27. See, e.g., Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938); The Pocket Veto 
Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929). Cf. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1975, at 30, col. 5 (state-
ment by Solicitor General Bork explaining the Executive's decision not to petition 
for certiorari in Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974), a pocket 
veto case). 
28. For example, in litigating separation of powers issues, the Solicitor General 
has sometimes advocated government interests other than those of the Executive. 
In United ~tates v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), plaintiff government employees 
challenged the validity of the Urgent Deficiency Appropriations Act of 1943, ch. 
218, § 304, 57 Stat. 450 (1943), which forbade payment of any compensation to 
them because they had not been reappointed by the President with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. The Solicitor General petitioned for certiorari on behalf 
of the United States even though the plaintiffs, who had been supported by the 
Solicitor General, had prevailed in the Court of Claims, 66 F. Supp. 142 (Ct. Cl. 
1945). The special counsel appointed to represent Congress had requested the Solici-
tor General to file the petition, but it appears that the Solicitor General inde-
pendently concluded that an authoritative disposition of the issues by the Supreme 
Court was "of the highest importance to the Government of the United States and 
particularly to its executive and legislative branches." Respondent's Brief for Cer-
tiorari at 9. The respondents agreed with the Solicitor General on the importance 
of the issue and so did not oppose the motion for certiorari. Memorandum for 
the Respondents. In argument on the merits, the Solicitor General urged that the 
Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1943 violated the constitutional prohibition 
of bills of attainder and invaded the constitutional powers of the President. He 
took no position, however, on the respondent's assertion that § 304 offended their 
right to due process. The Supreme Court decided the case on the ground that § 304 
was a bill of attainder proscribed by the Constitution. 328 U.S. at 318. 
In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Solicitor General joined in the 
brief for the Attorney General and the Federal Election Commission, which de-
fended the validity of the campaign contribution and expenditure limitations provided 
by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 
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sistent advocacy of the executive position leaves little doubt that, 
when executive powers are brought into question, the Solicitor Gen~ 
eral displaces the broad perspective associated with his office and 
serves as counsel to the President. 29 
It must be remembered that the roles served by the Solicitor 
General are not necessarily mutually exclusive. No doubt the Solic-
itor General handles most of the cases that come to his office without 
fretting over what role he should play. Moreover, in some cases 
where a conscious choice is necessary the Solicitor General may adopt 
one role while accommodating certain interests represented by an-
other. Nevertheless, even in •these cases a choice must be made, and 
this imperative raises the question of what considerations actually 
govern-and should govern-the Solicitor General's decision. To 
answer this question requires examination of the sources of his 
authority. 
(1972), as amended by the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 
Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974). However, he also submitted an amicus 
curiae brief for the United States in which he insisted that the provisions setting 
forth the selection procedure and the powers of the Federal Election Commission 
invaded the executive domain by according enforcement powers to a body not ap-
pointed in its entirety by the President. The brief also contained a discussion of 
the substantive provisions of the Act. Although this portion of the brief purported 
to assess the arguments of both sides fairly, the discussion did not conceal the 
author's distaste for the Act. Brief for the Attorney General as Appellee and for 
the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2. 
29. On only one reported occasion has the Solicitor General defied the Execu-
tive, and even then his defiance consisted merely of a refusal to argue for the 
government. Lewis, supra note 14, at 27, 30-31 (discussing refusal of Solicitor 
General to appear in Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955), in defense of the 
government's claim that it need not reveal the identity of accusers in loyalty and 
security cases). For a criticism of the Solicitor General's adherence to the executive 
view in one line of cases, see Werdegar, The Solicitor General and Administrative 
Due Process: A Quarter-Century of Advocacy, 36 GEO, WASH. L. REV. 481 (1968). 
The commitment of the Solicitor General to the Executive has compelled Con-
gress to take special measures to obtain representation of its interests. For example, 
in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), Congress' position was represented 
by a senator, who submitted a brief and presented oral argument at the request 
of the Court. 272 U.S. at 176. A member of the House appeared as an amicus 
by special leave of the Court to defend Congress in the Pocket Veto Case, 279 
U.S. 655, 673 (1929). When plaintiffs in United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 
(1946), discussed in note 28 supra, initiated their suit challenging § 304 of the 
Ur,gent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1943, Congress made special provision for 
appointment of counsel to defend the validity of the Act. H.R. Res, 386, 78th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 89 CONG. REC. 110882 (1943); H.R. Res. 230, 78th Cong,, 2d Sess., 
8 Stat. 113 (1944). 
In a few isolated instances the Attorney General has declined to assert a sug-
gested executive power. In Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798), 
the Attorney General disputed the contention that an amendment to the Constitution 
is valid only if signed by the President. 3 U.S. (3 Dall,) at 381. In United 
States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872), the Court invalidated a statute 
on the ground that it unconstitutionally infringes the power of the President to issue 
pardons. The Attorney General and the Solicitor General had argued in support 
of the law. 
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II. FOUNDATIONS OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL'S POWER 
A. Constitutional and Statutory Foundations 
331 
Except for the general provision that the President "shall take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed,"30 the Constitution is silent 
on the matter of legal representation for the government. One must 
look to statute for express provision for such representation. 
The Office of Solicitor General was created by the Judiciary Act 
of 1870.31 As then conceived, the Solicitor General was to serve 
merely as the Attorney General's associate responsible for the 
government's courtroom work. 32 The statutory delineation of the 
Solicitor General's responsibility has remained unchanged: he exer-
cises authority only as a delegate of the Attorney General. 33 Because 
of this derivative responsibility, analysis of the Solicitor General's 
function requires examination of the larger role of the Attorney 
General. · 
The legislative history of the Office of Attorney General contains 
no clear indication of how he should resolve intragovernmental con-
flicts involving the represention of the government in the courts. 
The Judiciary Act of 1789, which established the office, provided 
simply that the Attorney General shall "prosecute and conduct all 
suits in the Supreme Court in which the United States shall be con-
cerned."34 Some have argued that this language demonstrates that 
30. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. As head of an executive department, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 501 (1970), the Attorney General is obligated by the Constitution to submit 
opinions relating to his duties upon request by the. President, U.S. CoNST. art. II, 
§ 2, cl. 1. 
31. Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, § 2, 16 Stat. 162. 
32. See Letter from Attorney General Stanbery to the Senate (Dec. 20, 1867) 
quoted in H. CUMMINGS & C. McFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE 222-23 (1937); CONG. 
GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3065, 4490 (1870). Distressed by the large sums 
of public funds expended by the Attorney General to retain private attorneys to 
handle the crush of government litigation in the post-Civil War period, Congress 
expected the creation of a Solicitor General to eliminate the need to resort to out-
side counsel. See CoNG. GLOBE, supra, at 3035, 3065. 
The creation of the Solicitor General in the United States mirrored the Solicitor 
General's appearance in England some four centuries before. About the time of 
the reign of Edward IV (1461-1483), an attorney was appointed as a subordinate 
of the King's attorney, the Attorney General, to perform "the sort of informal work 
connected with litigation which fell to the lot of the private solicitors." 6 W. HOLDS-
WORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 462-63 (1924 ed.). See note 64 infra. In 
contrast to American practice, the Office of Solicitor General in England became 
a stepping stone to the Office of Attorney General. Id. at 463. 
33. See 28 U.S.C. § 505 (1970): ''The President shall appoint in the Depart-
ment of Justice, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a Solicitor Gen-
eral, learned in the law, to assist the Attorney General in the performance of his 
duties." The Attorney General may direct the Solicitor General to appear in a 
federal or state court to attend to the interests of the United States. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 517 (1970). Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 518 (1970) (conduct of litigation in the Court 
of Claims and the Supreme Court). 
34. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 92. The section also provided 
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the framers of the Constitution did not envision the Attorney Gen-
eral as an executive officer, 35 but history has clarified what the lan-
guage leaves ambiguous. Although the Attorney General at first 
served as de facto counsel for Congress36 and did not officially be-
come the head of an executive department until 1870,37 he was ac-
tually absorbed into the executive sphere much earlier.38 As the 
President's role in setting national policy grew, the distinction be-
tween the Attorney General's roles as adviser to the Executive and 
as chief legal officer of the United States blurred.39 Today, both 
the integration of Justice Department policy into the larger concerns 
of the Executive and the political and personal affinity between the 
Attorney General and the President are taken for granted. •0 
The significance of this historical development is that in the ab-
sence of any persuasive countervailing constitutional or statutory au-
for the Attorney General's preparation of advisory opinions upon the request of 
the President and department heads. 
35. See, e.g., Note, Removing Politics from the Justice Department: Constitu• 
tional Problems with Institutional Reform, 50 N.Y.U.L. REV. 366, 389 (1975). 
36. L. HUSTON, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 8 (1967), 
37. Id. at 35-36. 
38. Attorney General Edmund Randolph attended the first cabinet meeting, and 
ever since the Attorney General has been considered a member of the Cabinet. 
Id. at 9. 
The Judiciary Act of 1789 stipulated that the Attorney General shall "give his 
advice and opinion upon questions of law when required by the President of the 
United States, or when requested by the heads of any of the departments," Act 
of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 92, but did not provide for any corresponding 
obligation to furnish legal opinions to Congress. 
39. Attorney General Taney's support of President Jackson's campaign against 
the national bank is an early manifestation of the synthesis of the Attorney General's 
roles as legal counsel for and political affiliate of the President. See H. CUMMINGS 
& C. McFARLAND, supra note 32, at 100-19. A few Attorneys General have resisted 
political affiliation with the President. Edward Bates, Att(?rney General under Presi-
dent Lincoln, has been quoted as saying that "[t]he office of Attorney General 
is not properly political, but strictly legal; and it is my duty, above all other ministers 
of State to uphold the Law and to resist all encroachments, from whatever quarter, 
of mere will and power." Quoted in Miller, The Attorney General as the President's 
Lawyer, in ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 9, at 51 (1968) (emphasis 
original). 
40. See generally Miller, The Attorney General as the President's Lawyer, in 
ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 9, at 41-70; Rosenbaum, Choosing 
a Friend for Attorney General, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1976, at 13, col. 4. The 
relationship between the Justice Department and the President received considerable 
attention during Senate hearings on various proposals to reduce presidential control 
of the Department. See Removing Politics from the Administration of Jus-
tice: Hearings on S. 2803 and S. 2978 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers 
of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as 
Hearings on S. 2803 and S. 2978]. Several persons formerly associated with the Jus• 
tice Department or the Executive commented that the impact of many Department 
activities on matters within the ambit of executive policy required close rapport 
between the Attorney General and the President. See, e.g., id. at 18-19 (statement 
of Theodore Sorensen), 1~8 (statement of Ramsey Clark), 177 (statement of J. Lee 
Rankin). 
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thority the Attorney General's and, hence, the Solicitor General's rep-
resentation of the interests of the United States is likely to be re-
sponsive to executive command. Significantly, the one statutory pro-
vision that conceivably signified an effort by Congress to compel 
the Attorney General to look to it as the arbiter of the interest of 
the United States-the federaJ intervention statute-has not in prac-
tice displaced the preferred status of the Executive. This statute 
empowers the Attorney General to intervene on behalf of the United 
States in any proceeding in federal court in which the constitution-
ality of an act of Congress is questioned. 41 Since its purpose is "to 
insure adequate defense of federal legislation,"42 this act could be 
construed as imposing a duty upon the Justice Department to defend 
legislation exposed to constitutional attack. 43 There are two reasons 
to reject this interpretation, however. First, Congress did not compel 
the Attorney General to intervene. 44 Second, it is not clear that the 
statute requires the Attorney General to defend the statute in all 
cases in which he does intervene. Although several courts have 
suggested in dicta that the Attorney General can intervene pursuant 
to the act only .as a proponent of the statute in question, 45 the issue 
41. 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (1970), as amended by Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. 
No. 94-381, § 5, 90 Stat. 1120. Section 2403 reads in part: 
In any action, suit or proceeding in a court of the United States to which 
the United States or any agency, officer' or employee thereof is not a party, 
wherein the constitutionality of any Act of Congress affecting the public interest 
is drawn in question, the court shall certify such fact to the Attorney General, 
and shall permit the United States to intervene for ·presentation of evidence, 
if evidence is otherwise admissible in the case, and for argument on the question 
of constitutionality. 
The 1976 amendment also provided the states with an analogous right to intervene. 
Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, § 5(b), 90 Stat. 1120 (to be codified 
in 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b)). 
42. See 81 CoNG. REC. 3258-59 (1937); 38 COLUM. L. REV. 153, 153 (1938). 
43. Supporters of the measure in Congress asserted that "the government" has 
an adversarial interest in the constitutionality of congressional enactments. Con-
gress is entitled to provide for representation of this interest, the argument continued, 
and the Attorney General is the appropriate designee of this responsibility, as he is 
the chief legal officer of the government and, as an executive officer, obligated 
to execute the laws. See 81 CONG. REc. 3254-55, 3268-69 (1937). · . 
44. It has been suggested that Congress left the decision to intervene to the 
discretion of the Attorney General so that he could avoid unnecessary litigation, 
as where the constitutional challenge is frivolous or the statute is adequately de-
fended by a private party to the action, and so that he could select the most appropri-
ate test case for intervention when a statute is challenged in several proceedings 
concurrently. See 38 CoLUM. L. REv. 153, 156 (1938). See also Evans v. American 
Fedn. of Television & Radio Artists, 354 F. Supp. 823, 826 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), 
revd. on other grounds, 496 F.2d 305 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974) 
(although the Attorney General made no response to certification by the court pursu-
ant to § 2403, the district court noted that "[t]he issues have been fully briefed. 
Defendant is entirely capable of representing the public interest in the action, and 
the litigation is adversary, and not collusive"). 
45. See Wallach v. Lieberman, 366 F.2d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 1966); Smolowe 
v. Delendo Corp., 36 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). Cf. Sil CONG. REC. 3268 
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has not been decided, and in one case the Attorney General did join 
the attack on the constitutionality of a statute.46 Thus, Congress 
has not seen :filt to command the government's legal department to 
make every effort to save legislative determinations of what is in the 
best public interest. 
B. The Common-Law Foundation of the Attorney 
General's Power 
1. The State Attorney General's Authority 
Since neither the Constitution nor the statutes clarify the re-
sponsibility of the Solicitor General, it is helpful to consider a third 
possible source of authority for his conduct: the common law, which 
has been the inspiration and reference for the delineation of the 
powers of most state attorneys general. 47 Examining the authority 
of state attorneys general is useful for two reasons. First, state prac-
tice concretely illustrates the advantages and disadvantages of having 
a public advocate with independent standing to contest governmental 
acts. Second, the political stature of the state attorney general48 
(remarks of Rep. Michener) (1937) (suggesting that the Attorney General could 
exercise his discretion not to intervene if he is unwilling to support the statute). 
46. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 211 F. Supp. 628 (M.D.N.C. 
1962), revd., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964). 
The statutory provision challenged was § 622(f) of the Hill-Burton Act, ch. 958, 
60 Stat. 1043 (1946), which allowed hospitals receiving funds under the Act to 
maintain "separate but equal" facilities. Also challenged was a regulation promul-
gated by HEW pursuant to the Act. 21 Fed. Reg. 9841 (1956) (current version 
at 42 C.F.R. § 53.112 (1976) ). The defendants questioned the right of the Justice 
Department to intervene in support of the plaintiffs, but the trial judge granted 
the Department's motion for leave to intervene without reported comment. 211 
F. Supp. at 630. Writing for the circuit court, Judge Sobeloff, a former Solicitor 
General, remarked simply that "throughout the proceedings the Government, unusu-
ally enough, has joined the plaintiffs in this attack on the congressional Act and 
the regulation made pursuant thereto." 323 F.2d at 962. See also Krislov, Tire 
Role of the Attorney General as Amicus Curiae, in Rou; OF THE ATTORNEY GEN• 
ERAL, supra note 9, at 96-98. 
47. See NATIONAL AssN. OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, COMMON LAW POWERS OF 
STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 20-21 (1975) [hereinafter cited as COMMON LAW 
POWERS]. The definition of the attorney general's powers by reference to the com-
mon law does not necessarily preclude a statutory basis for his authority. Of the 
six states in which the attorney general's office is created by statute, the attorney 
general has common-law powers in four. See NATIONAL ASSN. OF ATTORNEYS GEN• 
ERAL, REPORT ON TiiE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 24, 39 (1971) [hereinafter 
cited as REPORT]. In two states, these common-law powers are conferred expressly 
by statute. HAw. REV. STAT. § 26-7 (1968 & Supp. 1975); VT. STAT, ANN. tit. 
III, § 152 (1972). In Alaska, the statute provides that the attorney general has 
those duties which are required by law "or which usually pertain to the office of 
attorney general in a state." ALASKA STAT. § 44.23.020 (1976). In Connecticut, 
the attorney general's powers, though enumerated at length in the statute, correspond 
to the usual common-law powers. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 3-125 (West Supp. 
1977). 
48. As of 1971, 42 states had elected attorneys general. The attorney general 
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points out differences in the scope of the authority of state and fed-
eral attorneys general to exercise independent judgment on behalf 
of the public interest. 
In most states, the attorney general enjoys substantial independ-
ent authority to contest governmental acts on behalf of the public, 
either by virtue of electoral mandate or through a constitutional or 
statutory conferral of broad powers to speak for the public. 49 In 
these states, two approaches have been followed to define the attor-
ney general's powers as public advocate. One is to grant the attor-
ney general the express authority to institute or intercede in certain 
types of cases. This approach is illustrated by Wisconsin law. The 
Attorney General of Wisconsin has no inherent power to bring legal 
action on behalf of the public, 50 but he does have statutory authority 
to prosecute an elaborate array of actions51 and, pursuant to general 
authority to represent the state, may advocate a public interest en-
trusted to the care of the state. 52 This general authority allows the 
Wisconsin Attorney General to contest acts of a state agency. For 
example, he has joined in the appeal of a decision of a state admin-
istrative agency58 and has brought an action contesting the constitu-
tionality of a legislative enactment. 54 
The second, and more prevalent, means of defining the powers 
of a state attorney general is through the adoption of common-law 
doctrine. Quite distinct from his obligation to the state government, 
the attorney general at common law has an inherent duty to advocate 
on behalf of -independent public interests. 55 There is no uniform de-
is selected by the governor in six states, by the legislature in one, and by the state 
supreme court in one. REPORT, supra note 47, at 62-63. 
49. See generally id. at 43-57. 
50. In re Estate of Sharp, 63 Wis. 2d 254, 217 N.W.2d 258 (1974). In Wiscon-
sin a distinction is drawn between the standing of the state and the standing of 
the Attorney General to bring an action. The power of the state to sue does not 
entitle the Attorney General to bring an action in the name of the state without 
express statutory authorization. See State v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 
136 Wis. 179, 116 N.W. 900 (1908). 
51. See Van Alstyne & Roberts, The Powers of the Attorney General in Wiscon-
sin, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 721, 739-47. 
52. E.g., the public right to recreational enjoyment of the navigable waters of 
the state. Muench v. Public Serv. Commn., 261 Wis. 492, 513-14, 53 N.W.2d 
514, 523 (1952). 
53. 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952). 
54. State ex rel • .Reynolds v. Smith, 19 Wis. 2d 577, 120 N.W.2d 664 (1963) 
( constitutionality of an apportionment statute). Conflicts between the governor and 
the legislature over apportionment are something of a tradition in Wisconsin. See 
State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 51 N.W. 724 (1892). 
55. See State ex rel. Dunbar v. State Bd. of Equalization, 140 Wash. 433, 249 
P. 996 (1926) (upholding power of attorney general to oppose, on behalf of the 
public, an agency or officer of the state). A suit instituted by the state attorney 
general to remedy injury done to the public may be brought in the name of the 
state, but still may be distinguished from a suit for injury to the institutions of 
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lineation of the powers of the attorney general at common law,50 but 
the core of the doctrine is the notion that the attorney general has 
the authority to "institute, conduct and maintain all such actions and 
proceedings as he deems necessary for the enforcement of the laws 
of the state, the preservation of order, and the protection of public 
rights."57 In some states, this responsibility to represent the public 
interest is considered. paramount to the obligation to provide counsel 
to the government.58 Attorneys general with common-law authority, 
like those with statutory authority, 119 have challenged state agencies 
for failing to comply with administrative standards00 and have con-
.tested the validity of statutes. 61 
The distinction between defining the attorney general's powers 
by a constellation of statutes and by the common law may be signifi-
cant only in theory. The common-law powers of an attorney general 
may be limited or partially withdrawn by statute, 62 and an attorney 
the state government. See, e.g., Queens Ins. Co. v. State ex rel. Attorney Gen,, 
22 S.W. 1048, 1052 (Tex. Ct. App.), revd. on other grounds, 86 Tex. 250, 24 
S.W. 397 (1893). But cf. St. Regis Paper Co. v. New Hampshire Water Resources 
Bd., 92 N.H. •164, 170-71, 26 A.2d 832, 838 (1942) (distinction between rights 
of the public and rights of the state is merely theoretical). 
56. De Long, Powers and Duties of the State Attorney General in Criminal 
Prosecutions, 25 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 358, 362 (1934): "The application 
from one jurisdiction to another of this seemingly simple principle [of common-
law power] has produced an astonishing array of mutations which make it altogether 
impossible to reach any sweeping generalization on the matter." 
57. Slezak v. Ousdigian, 260 Minn. 303, 308, 110 N.W.2d 1, 5 (1961). See 
Myhre, The Attorney for the State and the Attorney for the People: The Powers 
and Duties of the Attorney General of North Dakota, 52 N.D.L. REV. 349, 353-
57 (1975). In the words of one early court: 
[T]he principles of the common law . . . make the attorney general the proper 
representative of the people of the state in all courts of justice, and charge 
him with the official duty of interposing for the protection and preservation 
of the rights of the public whenever those rights are invaded, and there is 
no other adequate or available means of redress. 
Hunt v. Railway Co., 20 III. App. 282, 290 (1886), affd. sub nom. Hunt v. Chicago 
Horse & Dummy Ry. Co., 121 III. 638, 13 N.E. 176 (1887). 
58. Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock v. Paxton, 516 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1974); 
State ex rel. Dunbar v. State Bd. of Equalization, 140 Wash. 433, 249 P. 996 ( 1926). 
59. See, e.g., notes 53-54 supra and accompanying text. 
60. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Trustees of Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 319 Mass. 
642, 67 N.E.2d 676 (1946); State ex rel. Dunbar v. State Bd. of Equalization, 
140 Wash. 433, 249 P. 996 (1926). 
61. See, e.g., People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 66 Ill. 2d 65, 360 
N.E.2d 773 (1976); Wilentz v. Hendrickson, 133 N.J. Eq. 447, 33 A.2d 366 (Prerog, 
Ct. 1943), affd., 135 N.J. Eq. 244, 38 A.2d 199 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944); Common-
wealth ex rel. Hancock v. Paxton, 516 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1974); Hansen v. Barlow, 
23 Utah 2d 47, 456 P.2d 177 (1969). 
62. The common-law powers of an attorney general are subject to statutory mod-
ification in all states but Illinois. See REPORT, supra note 47, at 41. The Illinois 
Supreme Court has ruled that the constitutional provision that the attorney general 
"shall perform such duties as may be prescribed by law," ILL, CONST. of 1870, 
art. V, § 1, vested him with the irreducible powers of the attorney general at com-
mon law. Consequently, the legislature can expand but cannot diminish his powers. 
People v. Finnegan, 378 III. 387, 38 N.E.2d 715 (1941). This ruling was handed 
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general who exercises only specifically enumerated statutory powers 
may nonetheless acquire authority as comprehensive as that of his 
common-law counterpart. 63 Some differences can be discerned, 
however. If only because of his historical links to the English attor-
ney general, 64 the attorney general with common-law powers is 
thought to be more of an advocate for public interests in the admin-
istration of government and law than is an attorney general whose 
capacity to protect public interests is conferred 'by the legislature, 
for just as the attorney general in England was responsible for the 
interests of the sovereign Crown in the courts, the American attorney 
general with common-law authority represents the interests of the 
sovereign public. 65 
In some circumstances it might appear reasonable to qualify the 
attorney general's statutory or common-law power to advocate on be-
half of the public interest in opposition to administrative or legislative 
action. 66 Two principal objections have been raised to efforts by 
down under the 1870 constitution. The constitution now in force defines the duties 
of the attorney general in similar terms, ILL. CONST. art. 5, § 15, and thus the 
doctrine remains authoritative. 
Where the attorney general is a constitutional officer, the discretion of the legis-
lature to contract his authority is limited by the precept that the legislature cannot 
render the powers of the office nugatory as an alternative to outright abolition. 
See Johnson v. Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith, 291 Ky. 829, 165 S.W.2d 820 
(1942). 
63. E.g., Wisconsin, discussed in notes 50-54 supra and accompanying text. 
64. See 0. HAMMONDS, THE ATIORNEY GENERAL IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 
3 (Anglo-American Legal Hist. Series, Ser. 1, No. 2, 1939). The office of attorney 
general in England evolved during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as the King 
increasingly conducted his legal business through a single attorney with a broad 
charter rather than through several attorneys with powers limited to a particular 
court, region, or matter. By the end of the sixteenth century, the King's attorney 
had become the chief representative of the Crown in the courts, 6 W. HOLDSWORTII, 
supra note 32, at 458-61, and the pqwers he exercised were absorbed into the common 
law. See Cooley, Predecessors of the Federal Attorney General: The Attorney 
General in England and the American Colonies, 2 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 304, 309 
(1958). 
· 65. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock v. Paxton, 516 S.W.2d 865, 867 
(Ky. 1974). See also NATIONAL ASSN. OF ATIORNEYS GENERAL, PROCEEDINGS 61ST 
ANNUAL MEETING 1967, at 102 (1968). . 
66. Many states restrict the ability of the attorney general to contest governmen-
tal acts in either of two ways. The attorney general may simply lack standing 
to contest the actions of governmental entities in court. See, e.g., Arizona State 
Land Dept. v. McFate, 87 Ariz. 139, 348 P.2d 912 (1960) (under the state consti-
tution, Arizona attorney general has only those powers conferred by statute; since 
no statute authorized him to contest sale of public land by the Land Department, 
he could not sue to enjoin the sale). Even where the attorney general has standing 
to appear as an adversary to a state agency, he may lack independent authority 
to represent the public interest when, in the discharge of his duties, he serves as 
a subordinate to a branch of the government, ordinarily the governor. For example, 
an Alaska statute accords the state attorney general traditional common-law powers, 
ALASKA STAT. § 44.23.020 (1976), including general standing to advocate on behalf 
of the public. See text at note 55 supra. However, the Alaska attorney general 
is appointed by the governor subject to confirmation by the state legislature, serves 
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the attorney general to contest agency actions. First, the attorney 
general's opposition to agency conduct may deprive the agency of 
the means of securing representation that effectively advocates its 
side of the controversy. This concern raises a genuine problem im-
plicit in a system that expects a single official to represent dissimilar 
interests-the "public" and the state institutions-or to represent the 
government as a single entity when it is, in fact, a collective of dis-
parate elements. In some states, only the attorney general or his 
designee can represent a governmental litigant. 67 In such a state, 
an agency pursuing conduct opposed by the attorney general would 
lack representation in that controversy unless the attorney general 
appoints special counsel. And, because of the close relationship be-
tween the attorney general and his designee, one court has deter-
mined that this system does not provide the agency with adequate 
representation. 68 Fortunately, in most situations this problem can 
be resolved by the enactment of statutes authorizing an agency to 
retain counsel when the attorney general declines to take the 
agency's position. 69 
The opposition of the state attorney general to the action of a 
state agency has also been criticized as offending the legislative in-
tent that prompted creation of the agency. It has been argued that, 
by granting adjudicative or administrative powers to an agency, the 
legislature makes it the exclusive governmental arbiter of the public 
interest on matters within the scope of its jurisdiction. 70 Even if 
at the pleasure of the governor, ALASKA CoNST., art. III, § 25, and, as head of 
the state's legal department, is supervised by the governor, ALASKA CONST., art. 
III, § 24. Thus, although no case so states, it might be inferred that the attorney 
general exercises his power to advocate for the public interest entirely at the direc-
tion of the governor. 
67. The exclusive right of the attorney general to represent the government is 
maintained in some states as a doctrine of common law, see, e.g., Fergus v. Russel, 
270 Ill. 304, 110 N.E. •130 (1915), and in others by statute, e.g., ARIZ. REV, STAT. 
ANN. § 41-192(E) (West 1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-1614 (1975); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN.§ 109.02 (Page 1978). 
68. City of York v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Commn., 449 Pa. 136, 295 A.2d 
825 (1972). In this case, the commission's attorney had been appointed by the 
state attorney general pursuant to 66 PA. CONS. SrAT. ANN. § 460 (Purdon 1959). 
The court ruled that the attorney general could not intervene in an appellate pro-
ceeding to contest a ruling by the commission because the commission's attorney 
would be inclined to temper his advocacy to avoid offending his appointor. 449 
Pa. at 151-52, 295 A.2d at 833. One commentator has criticized the court's reason-
ing, contending in part that the trial judge can protect the commission's counsel 
from intimidation. Comment, The Attorney General as Consumer Advocate, 121 
U. PA. L. REV, 1170, 1182 (1973). 
69. Agencies have 'this statutory authority in several states. These statutes have 
been upheld as permissible legislative modifications of the attorney general's powers. 
See REPORT, supra note 47, at 50-51; Van Alstyne & Roberts, supra note 51, at 
728. 
70. See State ex rel. McKittrick v. Missouri Pub. Serv. Commn., 352 Mo. 29, 
175 S.W.2d 857 (1943). 
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this argument is accepted, however, at least three reasons suggest 
that it would not necessarily preclude the attorney general from 
challenging an agency ruling. First, the administrative responsibil-
ities of the government's legal department as established by statute 
may overlap with the agency's jurisdiction. 71 In this circumstance, 
the standing of the attorney general to contest the agency decision 
may be said to subsist by legislative designation rather than by infer-
ence from his status as public advocate. Second, it has been argued 
that to construe the rulings of a quasi-judicial agency as determina-
tions of the public interest blurs a necessary distinction between 
judge and advocate.72 In Muench v. Public Service Commission,13 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court observed that a ruling of the commis-
sion represented a weighing of the competing interests presented by 
parties with a stake in the outcome. The court noted that one_ of 
those interests may be a substantive public interest, and therefore 
it concluded that due process would be jeopardized if the agency 
were charged, in addition to its adjudicative task, with achrocating 
the claims of one of the several competing interests. 74 
The third reason for rejecting this legislative intent argument 
recognizes the important role the attorney general can play as a 
guardian of administrative integrity. Even if the attorney general's 
standing to contest agency action infringes upon the agency's dele-
gated authority to discern the public interest, that power of the attor-
ney general may nonetheless be warranted as a check against trans-
gressions committed by the organs of government. The attorney 
general may contest the validity of a governmental action simply as 
a means of compelling the agency responsible for the action to com-
ply with required procedure75 or to apply the proper law, 76 rather 
than forcing it to reconsider its policy decision. Insisting that the 
agency itself represents or determines the public interest fails to ap-
preciate that the "public interest" subsists not only in governmental 
policy, but also in the adherence by the organs of government to 
71. A troublesome source of overlapping administrative authority at the federal 
level is the intersection of antitrust enforcement and regulation of individual indus-
tries. See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964) 
(Justice Department attacked merger approved by the Federal Power Commission); 
United States v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (Justice Department 
attacked merger approved by the Comptroller of the Currency). 
72. See NATIONAL ASSN. OF ArroRNEYS GENERAL, ATIORNEY GENERALS' INTER-
VENTION BEFORE REGULATORY AGENCIES 3-4 (1975). 
73. 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952). 
74. 261 Wis. at 514, 53 N.W.2d at 523. 
75. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sorensen v. State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 
123 Neb. 259,242 N.W. 609 (1932). 
76. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dunbar v. State Bd. of Equalization, 140 Wash. 433, 
249 P. 996 (1926) (attorney general sued for writ of mandamus to compel state 
tax board to observe new rate schedule). 
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lawful procedure and in the respect of the constitutional limitations 
imposed on the exercise of governmental power. 77 
The power of the attorney general to challenge the constitutional-
ity of a statute has also been questioned. The basis for this criticism 
is the theory that acts of an elected legislature are authoritative ex-
pressions of the public interest that the attorney general is obligated 
to follow. 78 Nevertheless, the standing of the attorney general to 
initiate or to enter suits challenging the validity of a statute has been 
recognized as a common-law power79 and as a power inherent in the 
attorney general's constitutional or statutory duty to enforce the 
law. 8° Furthermore, the theory that the attorney general's duty to 
enforce the law bars him from opposing a statute is outweighed by 
his responsibility to enforce the constitution, particularly where no 
private party has standing to challenge the statute. 81 As with admin-
istrative action, the attorney general's power to contest legislative ac-
tion furthers a policy of subjecting governmental action to the re-
straining influence c;>f the attorney general's scrutiny as well as pro-
viding the widest possible scope to judicial review.82 
77. In Dunbar, the defendant board asserted that the statutory duty of the attor-
ney general to defend all actions brought against state officials barred his suit against 
the board. The court dismissed this contention, declaring that the Attorney General 
is not to 
sit supinely by and allow state officers to violate their duties and be recreant 
to their trusts. . . . [Rather his] paramount duty is made the protection of 
the interest of the people of the state, and, where he is cognizant of viola-
tions of the Constitution or the statutes by a state officer, his duty is to obstruct 
and not to assist, and, where the interests of the public are antagonistic to 
those of state officers, or where state officers may conflict among themselves, 
it is impossible and improper for the Attorney General to defend such state 
officers. 
140 Wash. at 440, 249 P. at 999. The prevailing theory in the Washington courts 
at the time of Dunbar appears to have been that the attorney general lacked common-
law powers, 140 Wash. at 438, 249 P. at 998; State ex rel. Winston v. Seattle 
Gas & Elec. Co., 28 Wash. 488, 68 P. 946 (1902). This strong language demon-
strates that the conception of the attorney general as advocate for the public is 
not confined to the common-law definition of his powers. 
78. See Comment, An Attorney General's Standing Before the Supreme Court 
To Attack the Constitutionality of Legislation, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 624, 627 (1959). 
19. See Wilentz v. Hendrickson, 133 NJ. Eq. 447, 33 A.2d 366 (Prerog. Ct. 
1943), affd., 135 N.J. Eq. 244, 38 A.2d 199 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944). 
80. See Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock v. Paxton, 516 S.W.2d 865, 867-68 (Ky. 
1974); Hansen v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 47, 456 P.2d 177 (1969). Contra, Baxley 
v. Rutland, 409 F. Supp. 1249 (M.D. Ala. 1976). 
81. See Comment, supra note 78, at 631-32. 
Several states have recognized a similar principle that public officials responsible 
for control of public funds have standing to challenge the validity of an appropriation 
statute. See Carroll v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 136 Conn. 49, 68 A.2d 299 (1949); 
Green v. City of Pensacola, 108 So. 2d 897 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Solberg 
v. State Treasurer, 78 N.D. 806, 53 N.W.2d 49 (1952). This principle would justify 
the Executive's position in United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427 (1896), wherein 
it unsuccessfully challenged the validity of a federal statute offering bounties to 
sugar producers. 
82. Quite often the attorney general's suit to contest the validity of a statute 
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As the foregoing discussion of state practice demonstrates, the 
common-law doctrine that the state's chief legal officer has inde-
pendent authority to speak on behalf of the public interest has im-
portant implications in American government. When he appears 
before a public agency, he may present a viewpoint that might other-
wise be unarticulated, and when he contests governmental action he 
brings to bear judicial sanctions against the abuse of governmental 
powers. In either event, by exercising his power the attorney gen-
eral may enhance the responsiveness of government to the public 
interest. 
2. The Common-Law Authority of the Attorney 
General of the United States 
Returning to the federal sphere, we face the threshold issue 
whether common-law authority is imputed to the Attorney General 
of the United States. As a preliminary observation, it is apparent 
that the objections to the Attorney General's power to oppose agency 
action can be overcome .in the federal setting as well as in the state 
setting. 83 First, since Congress has authorized most instrumentalities 
of the federal government to retain counsel, 84 the general obligations 
of the Attorney General and Solicitor General to conduct -the litiga-
tion of the United States and its agencies85 should not disable either 
from litigating as an adversary of an agency. Second, the assertion 
that an agency decision preempts a determination of the "public 
interest" by the Attorney General is inapposite where the Justice 
is directed against the administrative agency of the state responsible for administering 
the statute. See, e.g., State ex rel. Meyer v. Peters, 199 N.W.2d 738, 188 Neb. 
817 (1972); Wilentz v. Hendrickson, 135 NJ. Eq. 244, 38 A.2d 199 (Ct. Err. 
& App. 1944). Consequently, the problem of insuring representation of the agency 
may also arise. See notes 67-69 supra and accompanying text. In fact, the repre-
sentation of the agency is a question of greater moment when it is called upon 
to defend not its own judgment, but an act of the legislature. The one case found 
in which a state attorney general sued the governor was actually a challenge to 
a statute, since the attorney general contested not a discretionary act of the governor, 
but a statute vesting the governor with certain powers to appoint counsel for state 
agencies. See Johnson v. Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith, 291 Ky. 829, 165 S.W.2d 
820 (1942). 
83. See text at notes 66-77 supra. 
84. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1970) (NLRB); 15 U.S.C. § 78(d) (1976) (SEC); 
15 U.S.C. § 717s(c) (1976) (FPC). Prior to amendment, federal law provided that 
the executive departments shall secure all needed legal services from the Justice De-
partment. Judiciary Act of 1870, ch. 150, § 17, 16 Stat. 164 (1870) (codified at 5 
U.S.C. § 306 (1960) ). As part of the comprehensive rev-ision of Title 5 of the 
United States Code, Act of Sept. 6, 11966, Pub. L 89-554, § 4(c), 80 Stat. 613, Con-
gress narrowed the coverage of the statute to only those legal services needed in the 
conduct of litigation in order "to express the effect of the law. As agency heads [had] 
long employed, with the approval of Congress, attorneys to advise them in the con-
duct of their official duties, [this provision was] obsolete," Revisor's notes to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 516 (1970). See also H.R. REP. No. 901, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 186 (1965). 
85, 28 u.s.c. § 516 (1970). 
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Department has concurrent administrative jurisdiction86 or where 
the Attorney General or Solicitor General contests the agency deci-
sion on grounds of procedural irregularity or misapplication of a 
statute, matters expressly left open to judicial review.87 Thus, if the 
Attorney General does lack the power to advocate on behalf of the 
public interest, it is simply because no such power has been con-
ferred upon him by the common law, and not because of counter-
vailing problems of policy. 
The federal judiciary has analyzed the authority of the Attorney 
General to represent public interests less extensively than the state 
courts have examined that authority of state attorneys general to ad-
vocate the public interest. In the absence of any constitutional pro-
vision involving the Attorney General, this analysis must proceed 
from the basic legislation creating the office. As noted earlier, that 
legislation fails to specify who shall determine the interests of the 
United States in the event of intragovernmental conflict. 88 The ques-
tion here is whether these statutes incorporate common-law doctrine 
that vests the Attorney General with independent authority to advo-
cate the public interest. 
Some authority exists for ascribing to the Attorney General broad 
powers to serve as an advocate of the public. It has been suggested 
that the lack of substantive definition of the power and duties of the 
Attorney General in the Judiciary Act of 178980 was deliberate: 
under this analysis, the drafters of the Act shared a conception of 
the office based on common law, and thus they saw no need to 
enumerate the responsibilities associated with the position. 00 This 
86. See text at note 71 supra. 
87. See notes 75-77 supra and accompanying text. By providing for judicial 
review of agency decisions on grounds specified in § lO(e) of the Administrative 
Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976), Congress has implicitly indicated that an 
agency decision is not a definitive adjudication of the public interest. 
88. See text at notes 34-46 supra. 
89. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 92. 
90. 0. HAMMONDS, supra note 64, at 1. 
In Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925), the Court was required to construe 
the constitutional provision regarding the President's power to pardon, U.S. CONST., 
art. II, § 2, cl. 1. The Court prefaced its analysis with the observation that the 
framers of the Constitution 
were born and brought up in the atmosphere of the common law, and thought 
and spoke in its vocabulary. . . . [and) when they came to put their conclusions 
into the form of fundamental law in a compact draft, they expressed them 
in terms of the common law, confident that they could be shortly and easily 
understood. 
267 U.S. at 109. Since it is a familiar proposition that the acts of the first Con-
gress reflect the founders' intent, Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 174-75 (1926), 
the approach in Grossman should be employed in construction of early legislation as 
well as of the Constitution, and thus the Judiciary Act of 1789 can be read as 
embodying common-law principles. 
State courts construing similarly laconic statutes defining the powers of the attor-
ney general have been guided by the premise that the powers "are so numerous 
December 1-977] The Solicitor General 343 
argument is not implausible. The common law can be incorporated 
into federal law by statute,91 and the suggestion that the Judiciary 
Act adopted the common-law concept of the attorney general re-
ceived support in United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co.,92 where 
the Supreme Court stated in dictum that the Judiciary Act conferred 
common-law powers upon the Attorney General. 93 
However, there are two persuasive reasons to reject San Jacinta's 
dictum that the Attorney General enjoys common-law powers. 
First, close examination. of the case demonstrates that the Court in-
voked the common law not to establish the standing ~f the Attorney 
General to sue on his own initiative to protect the public interest, 
but rather to permit the federal government to bring an action to 
redress wrongs perpetrated against it. 94 The Court perceived that 
to deny the Attorney General standing to sue would leave the 
government without a judicial remedy. 95 Viewed in this light, the 
Court's infusion of common-law doctrine into the Judiciary Act was 
simply to enable the government to sue to protect its interests with-
out the need for a special act of Congress for each type of case, 96 
and not to create an independent role for the Attorney General as 
a public advocate. 97 
and varied that it has not been the policy of the Legislatures of the states to spe-
cifically enumerate them." State ex rel. Landis v. S.H. Kress & Co., 115 Fla. 189, 
199, 155 So. 823, 827 (1934). But cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 3-125 (West 
Supp. 1977) (lengthy enumeration of the traditional common-law powers). 
91. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 658 (1834). See also note 
47 supra. 
92. 125 U.S. 273 (1888). In this case, the Court held that the lack of express 
statutory authority did not bar the Attorney General from bringing suit to set aside 
a land patent issued by the government. 
93. Justice Miller's opinion for the Court stated that 
[t]he [J]udiciary [Act] of 1789, in its third section, which first created the 
office of Attorney General, without any very accurate definition of his powers, 
in using the words that "there shall also be appointed a meet person, learned 
in the law, to act as Attorney General for the United States," 1 Stat. 93, c. 
21, § 35, must have had reference to the similar office with the same designa-
tion existing under the English law. And though it has been said that there 
is no common law of the United States, it is still quite true that when Acts 
of Congress use words which are familiar in the law of England, they are 
supposed to be used with reference to their meaning in that law. 
125 U.S. at 280. See Van Alstyne & Roberts, supra note 51, at 729 n.46. In 
his concurring opinion, Justice Field remarked, however, that "[t]he powers of the 
executive officers of England are not vested in the executive officers of the United 
States government, simply because they are called by similar names." 125 U.S. 
at 307. Accord State ex rel. Winston v. Seattle Gas & Elec. Co., 28 Wash. 488, 495, 
68 P. 946, 949 (1902). 
94. In San Jacinto, the United States alleged that the land patent had been ob-
tained fraudulently. 125 U.S. at 275. 
95. 125 U.S. at 279-80. 
96. See 125 U.S. at 280. 
97. This interpretation of San Jacinto is corroborated by two subsequent cases 
in which the standing of the government was at issue: United States v. American 
Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888), and In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). In 
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A second, more important reason for denying the Attorney Gen-
eral common-law stature as advocate for the public interest is the 
political stature of his office. Most state attorneys general are 
elected officials,98 whereas the United States Attorney General is ap-
pointed by and serves at the pleasure of the President. 99 As such, 
these cases; involving, respectively, the government's standing to sue to set aside a 
patent and its standing to obtain an injunction against conduct disrupting interstate 
commerce, the Court disposed of the standing issue without reference to the powers 
of the Attorney General. The Court's analysis was predicated on the substance 
of the interest the government claimed entitled it to obtain a judicial hearing. 128 
U.S. at 367-70; 158 U.S. at 583-86. Once the government established that it had 
a justiciable interest, the standing of the Attorney General followed from his desig• 
nation as the government's advocate. 
The manifold powers of the federal government to promote public interests cover 
vast fields of public affairs. Because the "interests" of the federal government are 
so pervasive, the Attorney General has extensive authority to advocate on behalf 
of established public rights pursuant to the power granted him by 28 U.S.C. § 516 
(1970). For example, the Attorney General can sue to enjoin public nuisances 
deleterious to the federal interest in the "quality of air and water in their ambient 
or interstate aspects," United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, 346 F. Supp. 145, 
149 (D. Vt. 1972), injunctive relief granted, 363 F. Supp. 110 (D. Vt.), affd. mem., 
487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973), and to enjoin racially discriminatory personnel poli-
cies of state agencies administering federally funded programs, United States v. Fra-
zer, 297 F. Supp. 319 (M.D. Ala. 1968), relief granted, 317 F. Supp. 1079 (M.D. 
Ala. 1970), further opinion sub nom. NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. 
Ala. 1972), affd., 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974). However, § 516 does not autho-
rize the Justice Department to litigate merely because it believes that the government 
has an interest, United States v. Daniel, Urhahn, Seelye & Fuller, 357 F. Supp. 
853, 857-58 -(N.D. Ill. 1973). Even though 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1970) confers 
upon the Department substantial discretionary power to articulate the public interest, 
this discretion is limited by the power of Congress to deny the Attorney General 
authority to bring certain actions, see United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 
27 (1947), and by the need -to satisfy the court that the government has a justiciable 
interest in the case at bar, see United States v. Daniel, Urhahn, Seelye & Fuller, 
357 F. Supp. 853 (N.D. Ill. 1973). But cf. Booth v. Fletcher, 101 F.2d 676 (D.C. 
Cir. 1938), in which the court stated that the predecessor of 28 U.S.C. § 518 empow-
ered the Attorney General to participate in an action "whenever he deems it for 
the interest of the United States." 101 F.2d at 681 (emphasis original). This 
statement seems less far reaching, however, when it is noted that the Department 
attorneys appeared on behalf of defendant federal judges for injuries arising out of 
judicial duties, which clearly indicates that the United States had a direct interest in 
the case. 
98. See note 48 supra. 
99. 28 U.S.C. § 503 (1970). See notes 16-17 supra and accompanying text. 
On the power of the President to remove the Attorney General at his discretion, 
see text at notes 163-72 infra. 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the subordination of the Attorney General 
to the President. In San Jacinto, the Court concluded its discussion of the Attorney 
General's standing by noting that in exercising his powers "the Attorney General 
acts as the head of one of the Executive departments, representing the authority 
of the President in the class of subjects within the domain of that department and 
under his control." 125 U.S. at 280. Later cases have denominated the Attorney 
General "the hand of the President" in the enforcement of the laws. Ponzi v. 
Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 262 (1922); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965). 
The Court's recognition of the Attorney General's institutional role corresponds 
to the historical perception of the office evidenced in the views of early Attorneys 
General and of more recent commentators. See, e.g., Letter from William Wirt 
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the Attorney General can claim neither formal independence from 
other organs of government nor the mandate from the electorate that 
a publicly elected official possesses.100 This rationale does not 
deny the Attorney General power to contest the validity of a govern-
mental act; it stipulates only that he has no inherent power by virtue 
of his office to speak for the public. Thus, the Attorney General 
serves as proponent of public interests only where authorized by 
Congress101 and as directed by the President.102 
In sum, the United States Attorney General lacks constitutional 
or electoral autonomy from the political branches of the federal 
government. On one hand, he lacks an electoral constituency 
of his own, and, on the other, he exercises his powers at the discre-
(Attorney General from 1817 to 1829) to James Polk, July 21, 1828, quoted in 
H. CuMMINGS & C. McFARLAND, supra note 32, at 91. The Attorney General, 
in Wirt's view, is "the confidential law adviser of the Executive branch of the govern-
ment." Accord, 6 OP. ATIY. GEN. 326, 348 (1854); sources cited in note 40 supra. 
100. Cf. Position Paper of Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., presented to N.Y. 
Constitutional Convention, Comm. on the Executive Branch, Albany, N.Y. (June 
1, 1967), quoted in REPORT, supra note 47, at 66. 
To sum it up--an elected Attorney General has a measure of independence 
and a sense of personal and direct responsibility to the public. The elected 
official has a natural and impelling desire to be creative and to exercise broader 
initiative in the service of the public. He is free of the fear of dismissal by 
any superior official if he should exercise contrary independent judgme_nt. He 
is in the best position to render maximum service to the People and impartial 
advice to the Governor, the Legislature and State departments and agencies. 
He can appear in Court without fear or favor-an attorney in the fullest and 
finest sense of the word. 
(emphasis original.) 
The method by which the state attorney general is selected does not necessarily 
correlate with possession of common-law powers. Six of the eight states in which 
the attorney general is appointed grant him common-law powers, and in the other 
two the question is not decided. CoMMON LAW POWERS, supra note 47, at 20-
21. Yet, as of 1975, the attorneys general are all elected in the seven states that 
definitely do not recognize such common-law powers. REPORT, supra note 47, at 
66. 
101. In several important pieces of legislation creating federal causes of action 
for denial of civil rights, Congress has specifically authorized the Attorney General 
to intervene in actions brought under the statute. E.g., § 204(a) of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2 (Supp. V 1975). 
102. Cf. note 97 supra (broad powers to determine when such authority exists). 
It has often been said or implied that United States Attorneys have, or had, 
a common-law power to refuse to prosecute a person after indictment. United States 
v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 19-75); United States v. Brokaw, 60 F. Supp. 
100 (S.D. Ill. 1945). Brokaw declared that the United States Attorney "in his 
capacity as the public prosecutor in his district is clothed with the power and charged 
with the duties of the Attorney General in England under the common law." 60 
F. Supp. at 101. The suggestion that they are vested with common-law authority 
can be traced to the Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454 (1869), which 
appear to be considered the seminal authority. In these cases, the Court ruled 
that the Attorney General and the United States Attorneys (then called district 
attorneys) have the power to discontinue a prosecution unless otherwise prevented 
by statute. The Court stated that this doctrine was incontrovertible. It cited no 
authority, but pointed out that at common law and in admiralty, a litigant may 
relinquish his suit at any time. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 457-58. Presumably the 
Court adverted to the common law and admiralty as illustrations of the wide 
currency of the principle, not as the source of th~ holding. 
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tion of superior organs of the government. It must be concluded, 
therefore, that in resolving rival claims for representation the Attor-
ney General-and, hence, the Solicitor GeneraP03-is ultimately re-
sponsible to the Executive. This conclusion, though true to the his-
torical record, 104 is inconsistent with the view that the Solicitor Gen-
eral is to exercise autonomous judgment in choosing the position that 
best serves the interest of "the United States." This inconsistency 
suggests the appropriateness of an inquiry into the desirability of an 
autonomous Solicitor General. For if we are to seek institutional 
change to make the Solicitor General accountable to Congress or, 
even more radically, revise our political norms to allow the Solicitor 
General complete autonomy from both political branches, we must 
be certain that the change is warranted. 
III. BALANCING AUTONOMY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
To determine the desired scope of the Solicitor General's 
autonomy, it is important to examine the three principal contexts in 
which intragovernmental conflicts involving the Solicitor General 
arise: agency litigation, conflicts between the Congress and the Exec-
utive, and conflicts within the executive department. 
A. Agency Litigation 
The Solicitor General is called upon to resolve two kinds of con-
flicts arising out of his authority over agency litigation. First, when 
two agencies present competing views, the Solicitor General must 
choose from among his responsibilities to his government "clients."10G 
Second, when he disagrees with the position taken by an agency, 
he must choose between his responsibility to the government and his 
responsibility to the public interest.106 
In analyzing the Solicitor General's resolution of these conflicts, 
it is helpful to devote some attention to the question whether the 
Solicitor General's role in agency litigation should be eliminated. 
Two possible alternatives to the existing system may be suggested: 
each agency might be given control over its own litigation, 107 or the 
103. See text at notes 31-33 supra. 
104. See text at notes 31-40 supra. 
105. This conflict may occur in two types of cases-when two agencies are ad-
versaries and, more commonly, when the agencies appear as proponents of competing 
views in litigation in which a private party has challenged the action of one of 
the agencies. See, e.g., Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967); St. Regis Paper Co. 
v. United States, 368 U.S. 208 (1961). 
106. This disagreement may surface either at the certiorari stage or at argument 
on the merits. See Note, supra note 3, at 1461-64; text at notes 13-14 & 18-19 
supra. See also text at notes 115-31 infra. 
107. See note 3 supra. 
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management of agency litigation could be handled by an office inde-
pendent of the Executive. Congress undoubtedly has the power to 
adopt either of these proposals, 108 ·but the advantages of the existing 
system appear to outweigh the risks of radical change, even though 
some agencies may be embittered by the omnipresence of the 
Solicitor General. 100 
Leaving the decision to seek Supreme Court review to one of-
fice familiar with both the government's caseload and the attitudes 
of the Court is in the best interest of all concerned. The Solicitor 
General is often in a better position than an agency, and perhaps 
even the Court, to determine whether a particular case is propitious 
for deciding an issue, 110 and, as noted above, both the government 
and the Court benefit from the Solicitor General's screening of 
agency petitions.111 
· Further benefits accrue from placing the conduct of argument 
on the merits in the Court under the direction of one officer. Be-
cause the purview of his office is so broad, the Solicitor General can 
attempt to coordinate policies originating from different quarters of 
the government, and at least should be able to establish priorities 
and thereby avert or mitigate incongruity in government policy. 
When a collision between positions espoused by two or more agen-
cies is inescapable, the Solicitor General, because of his relative dis-
interest, may provide the Court with a trustworthy reading of the 
record and the competing policies.112 
It appears unlikely that a bureau independent of the Executive, 
responsible solely for directing agency litigation, could replicate the 
benefits associated with the centralization of this responsibility in an 
office based in the executive branch. It is true that eliminating the 
Solicitor General's control of agency litigation would remove a po-
108. The power to establish an independent office to handle agency litigation 
follows from the power to arrange for the conduct of agency litigation. 
109. The CAB lobbied for over a decade in a vain effort to achieve self-control 
of its litigation. Note, supra note 3, at 1451 n.48. 
Admittedly, management of an agency's litigation in the appellate courts by ad-
ventitious counsel unavoidably derogates from the agency's independence. See Mac-
Intyre, The Status of Regulatory Independence, 29 FED. B.J. 1, 7-8 (1969). Cf. 
the preamble to the 1973 "interim" legislation giving the FTC the power to conduct 
its own litigation, Act of Nov. 16, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408(a) (1), 87 
Stat. 591: "The Congress hereby finds that the investigative and law enforcement 
responsibilities of the Federal Trade Commission have been restricted and hampered 
because of inadequate legal authority to enforce subpoenas and to seek preliminary 
injunctive relief to avoid unfair competitive practices." The influence the Attorney 
General had over FTC policy before the passage of this law is illustrated by FTC 
v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U.S. 160 (1927). 
110. The Solicitor General has occasionally advised an agency that its chances 
of prevailing on an issue before the Court would be improved if it waited for a 
more favorable factual setting. Note, supra note 3, at 1457. 
111. See text at note 18 supra; note 24 supra and accompanying text. 
112. See Note, supra note 3, at 1467. 
348 Michigan law Review [Vol. 76:324 
tential source of executive distortion of the policies of supposedly 
independent bodies,113 but the executive affiliation of the Solicitor 
General is a major reason for his ability to supervise agency litigation 
effectively. Because the Solicitor General oversees virtually all 
government agencies, he can identify for the Court the legitimate 
executive interests raised in a particular case.114 Furthermore, be-
cause his responsibility to the administrative agencies is only part of 
his total responsibility, he has a stronger basis for taking a position 
contrary to an agency than would an official responsible solely for 
agency litigation. 
Assuming, then, that the Solicitor General will retain control of 
most agency litigation, how should he resolve the conflicts that arise 
out of that capacity? The resolution of the conflicts involves two 
problems: whether to petition for certiorari and how to formulate 
the Solicitor General's argument on the merits. As for approving 
certiorari petitions, the Solicitor General should continue to exercise 
discretion by weighing the significance of the issues presented, the 
_strength of the agency's position, and the receptivity of the Court.11G 
Only by retaining this prerogative to withhold approval can the Solic-
itor General serve both the Court's and the government's interest 
in narrowing attention to the cases of greatest import. If the Solie-
. itor General determines that a case presents an issue worthy of 
certiorari, 116 he should file the petition unless he believes that review 
of the case by the Court is inappropriate117 or impropitious.118 The 
Solicitor General should not veto a petition of a "certworthy" case 
merely because he disapproves of the policies that the agency is pur-
suing. Because it is difficult to determine whether a policy dispute 
is the determining factor in the decision not to petition, the Solicitor 
General should resolve any doubts in favor of the agency. By fol-
lowing this course, he can fulfill his responsibilities to screen out un-
worthy cases and to check an overreaching agency-in this context, 
by allowing a lower court decision to stand-without significantly in-
truding upon matters rightfully decided by the agency. Finally, it 
113. See text at notes 144-45 infra. 
114. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 
U.S. 10 (1963), where the Solicitor General, in an amicus brief for the United 
States supporting a challenge to a decision of the NLRB, pointed out that the Board's 
decision would have a serious detrimental impact on foreign relations. 
115. For a description of the Solicitor General's practice regarding certiorari peti-
tions, see Note, supra note 3, at 1453-57. In arguing for preservation. of the Solici-
tor General's responsibility for agency petitions, this Note reaches the same conclu-
sion presented in id. at 1457-59. 
116. See SUP. Cr. R. 19(11) for the Court's announced considerations bearing 
upon the decision whether to grant certiorari. 
117. If, for example, the record is irremediably defective. 
118. If, for example, the agency's position is not presented in a favorable factual 
setting. 
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is not the role of the Solicitor General to make ultimate decisions 
on questions of law or fact. Thus, he should ordinarily request that 
the Court review those cases that present issues -over which reasonable 
disagreement exists.119 
In arguing an agency case on the merits, the Solicitor General's 
first loyalty must be to the agency.120 Although the Solicitor Gen-
eral does have the prerogative to contest the position of an agency 
on the merits, 121 his responsibility for the management of agency 
litigation is not a license to impose his own views of the best interests 
of the government. The value of centralized management. of agency 
litigation would be lost if the Solicitor General routinely opposed 
an agency. Moreover, the Solicitor General's refusal to present the 
views of an agency may deprive the Court of a balanced presentation 
of the relevant governmental interests.122 
Despite the persuasive reasons for giving primary consideration 
to serving the agencies, the Solicitor General should retain discretion 
to oppose them. That opposition is unavoidable when two agencies 
assert adverse positions. 123 In these situations the Solicitor Gen-
119. On a few occasions the Solicitor General has refused to authorize the filing 
of a petition for certiorari even though the cases presented sufficiently important 
issues to merit certiorari because he could not in good conscience dispute the lower 
court's opinion. See Note, supra note 3, at 1455-56. Even in these situations, 
unless he believes that the ruling is so clearly correct that review by the Court 
would be a waste of time, the Solicitor General should allow the agency to file 
a petition itself while he files an opposing petition. ' 
120. See Stern, supra note 6, at 769. 
121. According to one study, the Solicitor General openly disagrees with an 
agency in a case heard on the merits about six to ten times a term. Note, supra 
note 3, at 1461. 
122. See United States v. El Paso Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 663 (1964) (Harlan, 
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), in which the Justice Department chal-
lenged a merger previously approved by the Federal Power Commission. Justice 
Harlan observed that the Court lacked a balanced exposition of the public interests 
at stake because no brief was submitted by the Commission. See also Note, supra 
note 3, at 1466-67. 
A striking instance of attempted suppression of the position of one gowmment 
agency by the Department of Justice occurred during, the extended litigation under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act of wage claims of workers employed by firms with 
cost-plus contracts with the Government during World War II. See, e.g., Powell 
v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497 (1950); Kennedy v. Silas- Mason Co., 
334 U.S. 249 (1948), discussed in Stem, supra note 6, at 765-67. The Department 
of the Army and the Department of Labor disagreed upon the validity of the claims. 
The Justice Department refused to allow government attorneys to raise the de-
fense that the FLSA did not apply to these workers. The Department also ad-
vised private attorneys not to press the argument. The Department relented after 
several lower courts held the defense valid, but was vindicated by the Court's ruling 
in Powell that the workers were covered by the Act. 
123. See note 105 supra. The Solicitor General has sometimes adopted a neutral 
stance in such cases by presenting no argument, see United States ex rel. Chapman 
v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153 (1953) (suit between Secretary of the Interior and the FPC), 
but this practice evidently has been abandoned, see Note, supra note 3, at 1465. 
Of course, the Solicitor General could furnish his analysis in an impartial format, 
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eral's advocacy may be especially useful to the Court because his 
position enables him to judge the likely ramifications of the opposing 
demands.124 The Solicitor General's opposition to the merits of an 
agency's decision presents a harder problem when that opposition 
rests upon his own view of the validity of the agency's position rather 
than on the stance of another agency. In the former circumstance, 
the Solicitor General steps outside the typical role of advocate for 
an institutional entity in order to promote broader government 
interests. The legal prerogative of the Solicitor General to support 
a challenge to an agency action on grounds that the agency miscon-
strued an applicable statute, made inadequate findings of fact, or vio-
lated constitutional rights has not been questioned.1211 The cases in 
which the Solicitor General has raised those objections seem to 
illustrate his commitment to broad government and public inter-
ests.126 However, closer inspection of the cases cited in one in-
depth study of the Solicitor General's work127 reveals that, in those 
cases in which the Solicitor General contested an agency's decision 
on the merits, the subject matter of the decision was in fact within 
the administrative jurisdiction of the Executive.128 Consequently, it 
is arguable that the Solicitor General is more often prompted to con-
test an agency's decision by concern for the jurisdiction of the Execu-
tive than by concern for the public's interest in the integrity of 
agency decisionmaking.129 
but concealment of bis partiality may be unrealistic and undesirable when he favors 
one side. 
124. See the Solicitor General's analysis of the first amendment issues raised 
by Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), in Brief for the Attorney General as 
Appellee and for the United States as Amicus Curiae. 
125. See generally cases discussed in Note, supra note 3, at 1459-67. See also 
Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 R2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 
707 ( 1943). In his celebrated opinion in Associated Industries announcing the the-
ory of the "private Attorney General," Judge Frank asserted that Congress "can 
constitutionally authorize one of its own officials, such as the Attorney General, 
to bring a proceeding to prevent another official from acting in violation of his 
statutory powers; for then an actual controversy exists, and the Attorney General 
can properly be vested with authority, in such a controversy, to vindicate the interest 
of the public oi:: the government." 134 F.2d at 704. 
126. See text at notes 13-15 supra. 
127. Note, supra note 3, at 1459-67. 
128. See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Federal Maritime Commn., 390 U.S. 
261 (1968) (antitrust enforcement); United States v. First City Natl. Bank, 386 
U.S. 361 (1967) (same); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Hondu-
ras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963) (foreign affairs). See also note 129 infra. 
129. A large proportion of the cases in which the Solicitor General contests 
an agency action involve the ICC, the one agency that has a long-standing .statutory 
right to control its own litigation, see note 3 supra. One can speculate that, because 
of this distinct status of the ICC, the Solicitor General has not felt as constrained 
by the responsibilities of his office to defend the ICC as he would be with other 
agencies. Alternatively, the disproportionate presence of ICC and, to a lesser extent, 
of Federal Maritime Commission cases among those in which the Solicitor General 
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That the Solicitor General's discretion to oppose an agency in 
order to promote the public interest is limited by his responsibilities 
to the agencies and by his representation of exe_cutive interests does 
not mean that he should be foreclosed from doing so. Many states 
have affirmed the value of according the government's advocate 
the power to place the public interest above the claims of an 
agency. 13° Furthermore, as a practical matter, prohibiting the Solic-
itor General from presenting views opposing an agency might tempt 
him either to keep a certworthy case from the Court in order to avoid 
reversal of the lower court decision or to disguise his opposition to 
the agency by misrepresenting its view to the Court.131 
Finally, the Solicitor General's authority to supervise agency 
litigation can be justified on a more theoretical level. The advent 
of the administrative agency has severely distorted the Constitution's 
original conception of the separation of powers. 132 This distortion 
has necessitated an adjustment in the scheme of checks and balances, 
which maintains the proper distribution of powers among the 
branches of the federal government. By exercising his supervlsory 
powers to restrain agency violations of individual rights and the 
usurpation of authority entrusted to other departments of the govern-
ment, 133 the Solicitor General furnishes a unique check on the inde-
pendent agencies. 
has opposed an agency could be explained by the power of the Solicitor General 
to keep other agencies who are unsuccessful in the Court of Appeals out of the 
Supreme Court by refusing to authorize petitions for certiorari. 
130. See text at notes 58-61 supra. 
131. Agencies occasionally complain that the Solicitor General dilutes their posi-
tions in order to mitigate a clash with another agency. Note, supra note 3, at 
1467. 
132. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 280-81 (1976) (White, J., concurring 
in part, dissenting in part). 
133. The Solicitor General's check on agency assertions is, of course, a qualified 
one. Although the Solicitor General may argue against an agency on the merits, 
the decision remains the province of the Court. It is worth noting that the opposi-
tion of the Solicitor General is not always a death knell for the agency. See, 
e.g., St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208 (1961). The control over 
petitions for certiorari partakes more of the nature of a conclusive veto in t}).at 
an agency may irretrievably lose a particular case. Nonetheless, the agency may 
be able to circumvent the Solicitor General by trying to win on the same arguments 
in a different circuit and hoping that the opposing party will petition for certiorari, 
or by convincing a private party to intervene on the side of the agency and to 
petition for certiorari if the agency loses. See Note, supra note 3, at 1453. Depend-
ing on the subject matter of the dispute, the agency may also look to Congress 
for relief. 
Ultimately, the Solicitor General must be and, history suggests, can be trusted 
to avoid persistent abuse of his office in contravention of agency independence. 
The occupants of the office recognize that exercising the discretion to deny an agency 
access to the Court for political ends would dissolve the confidence reposed in him 
by the Court and dissipate the value of the office. See Bork Hearings, supra note 
12, at 10-11 (statement by Solicitor General-designate Bork). 
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B. Congress and the Executive 
The second kind of intragovemmental conflict involving the So-
licitor General is disagreement between Congress and the Executive. 
These disputes fall into two classes: those involving the respective 
powers of the two branches and those involving the constitutionality 
of congressional acts not impinging upon the separation of powers.134 
The Solicitor General and the Department of Justice135 have almost 
without exception defended the validity of executive acts, but they 
have not shown similar loyalty to ·acts of Congress.136 This disparity 
seems inconsistent with the coequal stature of Congress and the Exec-
utive. Congressional pronouncements represent the "interests" of 
the United States with at least as much authority as executive deci-
sions, and the "institutional" prerogatives of Congress are as essen-
tial to the constitutional scheme of government as are those of the 
Executive.137 
So long as the Solicitor General remains an officer of the execu-
tive branch this asymmetry in his commitments to the two political 
branches of the government is not surprising, 138 and it does not seri-
ously distort the equality between them.139 When Congress or one 
of its subdivisions litigates as a party, it undoubtedly prefers repre-
sentation by counsel responsible solely to it, and Congress has ready 
134. Some cases represent hybrid situations. In United States v. Lovett, 328 
U.S. 303 (1946), the Justice Department attacked a statute as both an invasion 
of executive prerogatives and a denial of constitutional rights of individuals. 
135. The posture of the Solicitor General cannot be considered in isolation in 
those cases where the position of the government is formulated, in the first instance, 
by other attorneys in the Justice Department. The Solicitor General plays no formal 
part in government litigation until a case reaches the appellate stage. See 28 C.F.R. 
§ 0.20 (1977). And, although the Solicitor General can repudiate the position ar-
gued by the Department attorneys in the lower courts, by "confessing error," see 
Note, supra note 15, the position of the Executive is articulated before the Solicitor 
General enters the case. 
1136. See text at notes 25-29 supra and accompanying text. 
137. The Court has recognized that Congress' interests are entitled to representa-
tion in litigation involving the separation of powers. Justice Frankfurter commented 
that "[n]ot the least significant aspect of [the Myers case] is that on the Court's 
special invitation Senator George Wharton Pepper . . . presented the position of 
Congress at the bar of this Court." Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 353 
(1958). See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), discussed in note 140 
infra. 
138. Cf. Matthew 6:24 (King James) ("No man can serve two masters ••• "). 
The focus of the analysis here is the relative claims of Congress and the Presi-
dent for the services of the Solicitor General. Therefore, it is assumed that 
the personal views of the Solicitor General are immaterial. The implications of 
conflict between the Solicitor General and the President are considered in text at 
notes 144-57 infra. 
139. Unlike disputes among administrative agencies, litigation of the respective 
powers of Congress and the Executive does not entail sorting out overlapping admin-
istrative policies. Thus, there is less need for a disinterested decisionmaker familiar 
with the workings of the government. Cf. text at note 112 supra. 
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means to obtain such counsel.140 Although Congress' advocate may 
not carry the aura of the Solicitor General, the Court no doubt recog-
nizes that in litigation in which the Congress and the Executive are 
adversaries, the Solicitor General acts as an attorney for the Presi-
dent. 
Similar reasoning governs in interdepartmental disputes over 
congressional acts not affecting the institutional interests of the Exec-
utive. Before reaching the question of the Solicitor General's role 
in such matters, however, one must consider whether the Executive· 
has standing to challenge such actions. If standing exists, it is clear 
that the Solicitor General could assert it on behalf of the Executive. 
One may argue that the Executive, by virtue of its constitutional 
duty to faithfully execute the laws, is precluded from applying for 
judicial rescission of congressional enactments.141 This theory, how-
ever, has not barred the Executive from contesting the constitution-
ality of statutes that allegedly infringe upon executive powers.142 
Yet when the Executive-through the Solicitor General--opposes a 
statute not involving the respective powers of the two branches of 
government, it is arguable that Congress suffers a serious deprivation 
of representation. By hypothesis, however, one p~ in these cases 
seeks to uphold the statute and thus supports the congressional in-
140. In the past, when the Justice Department has either aligned itself with 
the party adverse to Congress or maintained neutrality, Congress or a congressional 
committee has retained private counsel, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 
(1946); Er parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1868), further opinion, 74 
U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869), or committee counsel, e.g., Senate Select Comm. on 
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 370 F. Supp. 521 (D.D.C.), affd., 498 
F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In one case, an individual member of Congress argued 
pro se. Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Several bills have 
been introduced in recent years to establish a permanent office of congressional 
counsel, which would represent Congress or any part thereof when party to a lawsuit 
arising out of official action. See S. 495, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 201-203 (1976); 
H.R. 14795, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 201-203 (1976); S. 2036, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 
§§ 401, 402 (1975); S. 2615, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2, 3(a)(5) (1973). In Myers 
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), in which the Solicitor General attacked the 
constitutionality of a statute prohibiting the removal of a postmaster by the President 
before expiration of the postmaster's term of office, a senator as amicus curiae 
presented a brief and oral argument in favor of the statute at the request of the 
Court. 272 U.S. at 176. Individual members of Congress submitted several amicus 
briefs supporting the statute challenged in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
The proposals for establishment of an office of congressional counsel also pro-
vided that such counsel could intervene or appear as amicus curiae to defend a 
federal statute in any action wherein its constitutionality is brought into question. 
See S. 495, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 205(a)(1) (1976); H.R. 14795, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess. § 203(d)(1) (1976); S. 2036, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 402(a)(4)(A) (1975); 
S. 2615, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (4) (1973). 
141. In light of the supremacy clause, U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2, the President's 
duty to execute the laws might be read as a duty to execute only those laws that 
are constitutional. An executive challenge to a statute may thus be consistent with 
the faithful execution clause. Were the "laws" of the latter clause construed to 
include the Constitution as well as statutes, one might even argue that the Executive 
is obligated to challenge statutes it deems unconstitutional. 
142. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 26-27 supra. 
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terest, and Congress can arrange for presentation of its views as an 
amicus.143 
'C. Intra-Executive Conflict 
Conflict between the Solicitor General and the President may 
arise in any area of the Solicitor General's work. In adjudging the 
obligation of the Solicitor General to abide by a presidential com-
mand, a distinction must first be drawn between the Solicitor Gen-
eral's management of agency litigation and his representation of the 
government in cases arising out of the administration of executive 
functions. In regard to agency litigation, the Solicitor General 
should rebuff efforts by the President to dictate or to influence the 
decisions on certiorari petitions and the formulation of argument pre-
sented for the agency. It is proper for the Solicitor General to pre-
sent the views of the Executive to the Court in cases pertinent to 
matters within executive jurisdiction, but the Solicitor General must 
take care to separate these views from those of the agency involved 
in the dispute. Failure to do so may jeopardize agency independ~ 
ence. Therefore, when the Solicitor General believes that his 
espousal of the executive position unfairly colors his representation 
of the agency, he should allow the agency to speak for itself rather 
than attempt to present both positions or, even worse, surreptitiously 
compromise the agency's claims. 
Although the views of the Executive on issues within its admin-
istrative domain should be presented, the Executive has no license 
to intercede in litigation of the independent agencies. The legiti-
macy of the Solicitor General's control over agency litigation is 
premised upon the notion that executive preferences do not dictate 
whether the Solicitor General will petition for certiorari or contest, 
in his role as watchdog for the public, the legality of an agency de-
cision.144 The Executive should respect the autonomy of the Solic-
itor General in this area because the Solicitor General's authority to 
handle agency litigation is derived from tacit congressional delega-
tion.145 Presidential meddling in agency litigation, therefore, con-
stitutes an intrusion on both the independence of the agency and 
the obligations of the Solicitor General to Congress. 
Different considerations govern the role of the Solicitor General 
in cases in which the Executive becomes a party in order to discharge 
143. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Myers v, United States, 
272 U.S. 52 (1926), discussed in note 140 supra. 
144. One may presume that the President would disagree with the Solicitor Gen-
eral's decision not because of a differing legal analysis but rather because of politi-
cal motives. 
145. See note 3 supra. Congress can delegate to an executive officer administra-
tive responsibilities comparable to those typically delegated to an independent agency, 
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928). 
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its responsibility to execute the laws. It is useful to divide this area 
of governmental litigation into cases in which the Executive is neces-
sarily a party-criminal prosecutions and civil actions involving exec-
utive agencies or claims against the United States-and cases in 
which it appears by discretion--,as an intervenor146 or as an amicus 
curiae. Given that "executive power" is vested by the Constitution 
exclusively in the President, 147 the government's attorneys serve as 
agents of the President in both kinds of cases148 and must, therefore, 
comply with his instructions. 149 It has been suggested, however, that 
the Solicitor General should not defer to the executive position when 
it offends constitutional rights, 150 on the theory that the public inter-
est in the lawfulness of official action is as compelling in the sphere 
of executive action as it is in the domain of the administrative agen-
cies. Conceivably, then, the Solicitor General could promote this 
interest as adversary to the Executive. The Solicitor General may, 
of course, render his opinion to the President on the legality of a 
146. 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (1970), as amended by Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. 
L. No. 94-381, § 5(b), 90 Stat. 1120. 
147. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1. 
148. The Solicitor General's claim to independence from the President is arguably 
stronger when he appears as an intervenor or amicus since he does so on behalf 
of himself as protector of the public interest, not on behalf of the President, see 
text at notes 8-12 supra. Cf. Note, supra note 3, at 1478-79 (observing that the 
Solicitor General exercises the greatest independence in his appearances as amicus 
in cases involving fundamental issues of constitutional law). 
It may also be argued that when the United States intervenes under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2403 (1970), the Government's attorneys appear on behalf of Congress. See text 
at notes 41-43 supra. The discretion allowed the Attorney General under § 2403 
suggests otherwise, however. See text at notes 44-46 supra. Compare § 2403 with 
intervention provisions of the various bills introduced to establish an office of con-
gressional counsel cited in note 140 supra. 
149. The Watergate Special Prosecutor Wal}, of course, an obvious exception. 
In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694-95 (1974), the Supreme Court upheld 
the Special Prosecutor's authority to sue the President in the name of the United 
States. The decision does not contradict the President's position as the highest execu-
tive authority insofar as the Court rested its ruling on the delegation of authority 
by the President's subordinate, the Attorney General, to the Special Prosecutor, 38 
Fed. Reg. 30738 (1973), as amended by 38 Fed. Reg. 32805 (1973), which specific-
ally authorized the Special Prosecutor to contest a claim of executive privilege. See 
418 U.S. at 694-96. Cf. Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973) (Presi-
dent's dismissal of Special Prosecutor Cox illegal so long as regulation prohibiting 
unilateral dismissal, 38 Fed. Reg. 14688 (1973), remained in effect). It has been 
argued that insofar as the Special Prosecutor in Nixon claimed to act on behalf 
of one executive interest-the conduct of a criminal investigation-and the President 
opposed his request for documents on grounds of another executive interest-the 
confidentiality of executive communications-the Special Prosecutor's judgment of 
which executive interest should prevail as the position of the executive should have 
been subordinated to the judgment of the President. Van Alstyne, A Political and 
Constitutional Review of United States v. Nixon, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 116, 133 
( 1974). One can, however, read the regulation defining the Special Prosecutor's 
powers as a delegation of the prerogative to determine, as well as to sue on behalf 
of, the primary executive interest in matters within the scope of his authority. 
150. Werdegar, supra note 29, at 513. 
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proposed course of action, 151 and he may withdraw from a case152 
or, in the extreme, resign if he cannot in good conscience advocate 
the position adopted by the Executive. However, he has no institu-
tional warrant to oppose the President. 
In _practice, serious conflict between the Solicitor General and 
the President is probably rare. The President, after all, commands 
the power of removal, and thus a Solicitor General interested in re-
taining his position would ordinarily defer to the President's will. 
More significantly, by appointing a Solicitor General whose political 
persuasion he shares and whose legal judgment he respects, the 
President can minimize the likelihood of conflict over the conduct 
of the Executive's litigation. 
Nevertheless, situations may arise in which the Solicitor General 
would, in the absence of practical restraint, defy the President, either 
by refusing to adyocate the position adopted by the President or by 
submitting an argument rejected by the President. Despite the ap-
parent desirability of allowing the Solicitor General a great degree of 
autonomy, it is difficult to support a claimed prerogative to defy the 
President. The values militating in favor of autonomy do not 
pertain in the context of litigation involving the Executive. Inde-
pendence enables the Solicitor General to assist the Court by providing 
a detached exposition of competing claims1G3 and to speak for the 
public interest when government actors violate the law. He can 
serve the Court in an advisory capacity in conflicts between two 
administrative agencies because in such cases he occupies a position 
of relative disinterest and because proper resolution of the issues 
may require analysis by one familiar with the complexities of adminis-
trative policy.154 When, however, the Executive is an adversary, 
the Solicitor General does not occupy this neutral position. More-
over, in cases not involving complex administrative matters, the 
Court's need for disinterested counsel is reduced.155 
Furthermore, the Solicitor General does not have the political 
legi~imacy to advocate on behalf of "the United States" independent 
of Congress and the -President. In this respect, the Solicitor Gen-
eral's opposition to an administrative agency is distinguishable from 
his oppo&ition to the President. Agencies are subordinate arms of 
the government that exercise authority only by delegation, and thus 
151. See Hearings on S. 2803 & S. 2978, supra note 40, at 190 (&tatement of 
former Solicitor General J. Lee Rankin). 
152. See, e.g., Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955), discussed in Lewis, supra 
note 14, at 27. 
153. See notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text. 
154. See text at note 112 supra. 
155. This does not mean that the Solicitor General cannot make a valuable 
contribution to constitutional litigation, as his amicus practice overwhelmingly dem-
onstrates. See Note, supra note 3, at 1478-79. 
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when the Solicitor General disputes an agency he does so with the 
tacit authorization of Congress. The Solicitor General can claim no 
similar warrant to argue adverse to the Executive.156 
The conclusion that the Solicitor General can advocate only 
under the auspices of a branch of the federal government is sup-
ported by an examination of the authority of state attorneys general. 
In all but a handful of states, the attorney general is elected and, 
therefore, has a popular mandate to express the public interest and 
enjoys freedom from the institutional constraint implicit in the ab-
sence of tenure. Most states have enhanced the stature of the attor-
ney general by conferring common-law powers on that office.157 In 
the federal scheme, the authority to express the sovereign will has 
not been dispersed so broadly as in the states. The Solicitor Gen-
eral, it follows, can exercise such authority only under the aegis of 
Congress or the President. 
IV. ALTERING THE BALANCE THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
Under existing law, the Solicitor General operates in an execu-
tive capacity. Consequently, he is ultimately responsible to the 
President and must comply with his bidding. Because the statutory 
scheme dictates this relationship, some attention must be given to 
the question whether the Constitution would allow an alternative 
scheme in which the Solicitor General would be either truly autono-
mous or held accountable solely to Congress. The answer to this 
question is shaped by the definition and allocation of the power to 
appoint government officials, the power to set the terms of their 
removal, and the power to dictate their conduct. 
156. The Solicitor General's opposition to a governmental litigant acting in the 
name of the United States may legitimately occur in two situations. The first arises 
where the United States is denominated as a defendant in certain actions brought 
against independent agencies. For example, under 28 U.S.C. § 2322 (1970), the 
"United States" is a party defendant in an action appealing an ICC decision. Thus, 
when the federal government, as a shipper, challenges an ICC ruling, the suit is 
technically "United States v. United States." See United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 
426 (1949). In the second, more significant, situation the Solicitor General could 
oppose "the United States" where the United States is represented by Congress, 
since at least one court has recognized that Congress can authorize itself or one 
of its committees to sue in the name of the United States. Senate Select Comm. 
on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51, 56 (D.D.C. 1973), 
further opinion, 370 F. Supp. 521 (D.D.C.), affd., 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 
1974). See Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry, Part II, 12 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1288, 1334 n.631 (1965). But cf. The Gray Jacket, 72 U.S. 
(5 Wall.) 370 (1867), where the Supreme Court declared in dictum that "in causes 
where the United States is a party, and is represented by the Attorney-General, 
. . . no counsel can be heard in opposition on behalf of any other of the departments 
of the government." - 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 371. That statement appears to be 
limited to opposition by other executive departments, however. 
157. See notes 55-61 supra and accompanying text. 
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The Supreme Court's latest pronouncement on the powers of ap-
pointment, Buckley v. Valeo,158 forecloses any argument that the ap-
pointment of the Solicitor Gener,al may escape the requirements of 
the appointments clause.159 Although the Court in Buckley failed 
to define who is an "officer of the United States," it emphasized that 
any official with "responsibility for conducting civil litigation in the 
courts of the United States for vindicating public rights" is such an 
officer.160 As the Solicitor General clearly meets this description, 
the only alternative to the present method of filling that office would 
be to vest the power uf appointment solely in the President, the head 
of an executive department, or the judiciary.161 Of these possibilities, 
only the last would diminish executive control over. selection of the 
Solicitor General. That procedure, however, would offend the con-
cept of separation of judge and advocate and would oblige the judici-
ary to undertake an unfamiliar administrative responsibility.162 
Restricting the President's power to remove the Solicitor General 
is a second possible means of allowing the Solicitor General greater 
independence. Were the Solicitor General appointed for an abso-
lute term of years or dismissible only for cause, 163 he could defy the 
President without jeopardizing his employment. The validity of this 
limitation on the power of removal is measured by the two landmark 
cases in this area, Myers v. United States164 and Humphrey's Exe-
cutor v. United States. 165 These cases indicate that the touchstone 
of whether the Executive possesses absolute removal power is the 
"character of the office" in question.166 Thus, Congress has the con-
stitutional power to shield the Solicitor General from peremptory dis-
missal by the President only if the conduct of the United States' liti-
gation does not represent primarily an executive function.167 
158. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
159. U.S. CONST., art. n, § 2, cl. 2. 
160. 424 U.S. at 140. 
161. Such alternatives would be permitted only if the Solicitor General were 
deemed an "inferior officer." U.S. CoNsT., art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
162. Courts have traditionally shunned responsibility for choosing governmental 
officials. See, e.g., Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104, 109 (D.D.C. 1973). But cf, 
28 U.S.C. § 546 (19170) (federal district court authorized to appoint a United States 
attorney in event of a vacancy); but see TENN. CONST., art. 6, § 5 (attorney general 
appointed by the state supreme court). Although the original Senate version of 
the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 93, provided for appointment of the United 
States Attorney General by the Supreme Court and of United States Attorneys by 
the district courts, the final version provided for Presidential appointment. 0, HAM-
MONDS, supra note 64, at 23. 
163. See, e.g., the provisions for the appointment of commissioners of the Federal 
Trade Commission, 15 U.S.C. § 4'1 (1976); and of the members of the National 
Labor Relations Board, 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1970). 
164. 272 U.S. 52 (1926): 
165. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
166. 295 U.S. at 631; accord, Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958). 
167. See Note, supra note 35, at 397-405. But cf. id. at 399 (arguing that 
the conduct of litigation is an executive function). 
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It has been established that the power to institute and conduct 
litigation for the United States is not reserved exclusively for the 
Executive.168 Moreover, the prerogative of Congress to delegate to 
an independent agency the authority to conduct litigation in the en-
forcement of its rules and decisions suggests that Congress has an 
underlying power to control the conduct of all litigation to which the 
United States is a party, since in theory Congress cannot delegate 
a power it does not possess. However, the anomalous situation of 
the independent agencies should not govern the mainstreams of the 
separation-of-powers doctrine.169 When the Court has expounded 
upon the faithful execution clause,170 it has consistently found that 
the provision vests in the Executive the power to conduct the litiga-
tion of the United States.171 Most recently, the Court declared that 
"[a] lawsuit is the ultimate remedy for a breach of the law, and it is 
to the President, and not to the Congress, that the Constitution 
entrusts the responsibility to 'talce Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.' "172 The inescapable conclusion is that, although the 
Court may countenance parceling a limited measure of the power to 
execute the laws in the name of the United States to an independent 
agency with narrowly defined jurisdiction, the Court does adhere to 
the precept that this power is in the main an executive power. It 
follows that the removal doctrine proscribes compromising the Presi-
dent's authority to remove the Solicitor General. 
The third question bearing on the ability of Congress to limit the 
President's control of the Solicitor General is the extent to which 
Congress may regulate the Solicitor General's conduct.173 Executive 
168. FTC v. Guignon, 390 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1968); ICC v. Chatsworth Coop. 
Marketing Assn., 347 F.2d 821 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 938 (1965); notes 
3 & 140 supra. Cf. S & E Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 406 U.S. 1 (1972) 
(Congress can disqualify the Justice Department from challenging a decision of a 
government agency adverse to the government); United States v. California, 332 
U.S. 19, 27 (1947) (Congress can deny the Attorney General authority to prosecute 
for the government a specified category of claims). 
169. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 280-81 (1976) (White, J., concurring 
in part, dissenting in part) ("There is no doubt that the development of the admin-
istrative agency in response to modem legislative and administrative need has placed 
severe strain on the separation-of-powers principle in its pristine formulation"). 
170. U.S. CONST., art. II,§ 3. 
171. See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890), in which the Court intimated that 
the duties assigned to executive departments are obligations imposed upon the Execu-
tive by the faithful execution clause that the President cannot perform personally. 
The Court referred specifically to United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 
273 (1888), as illustrating the proposition that the Attorney General performs ex-
ecutive duties in bringing suit to protect the interests of the United States. 135 
U.S. at 63-64, 66-67. See also Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254 (1922), in which 
the Court equated "taking care that the laws be faithfully executed" with "protection 
of the interests of the United States in legal proceedings and in the prosecution 
of offenses." 258 U.S. at 262. 
172. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976). 
173. For example, Congress could amend the intervention statute, 28 U.S.C. 
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officials are not at liberty to ignore legislation mandating perform-
ance of prescribed action, 174 and the Supreme Court has specifically 
acknowledged the power of Congress to superintend the operations 
of the Justice Department.175 
Beyond these generalizations, however, the federal courts have 
not clarified the limits of Congress' power to direct executive action. 
Judicial discourse on the Executive's duty to "take Care that ,the Laws 
be faithfully executed" has suggested both that the Executive com-
mands a certain iirreducible discretion in this duty176 and, conversely, 
that this discretion might exist only by grace of Congress. 177 One 
of the early leading Supreme Court cases on this subject appears to 
adopt both positions. 178 Although it might be argued that the duty 
§ 2403 (1970), to mandate that the Justice Department intervene in all cases in 
which a statute is attacked and defend the statute. Moreover, conceivably, Congress 
could either direct the position to be argued by the Solicitor General through special 
legislation for a particular case or require the Solicitor General to secure approval 
of his proposed argument from a congressional committee. On the use by Congress 
of the concurrent resolution and committee veto to control executive action, see 
generally Watson. Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the 
Executive, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 983, 995-1029 (1975). 
174. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838); 
National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1974); 
State Highway Commn. v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973 ). Even where 
the discharge of statutory responsibility requires exercise of discretionary judgment, 
an executive official can be compelled to exercise this discretion in a manner con-
sistent with the statutory guidelines. Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 376 
F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974). 
175. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927). In the words of Justice 
Van Devanter, "the functions of the Department of Justice, the powers and duties 
of the Attorney General and the duties of his assistants, are all subject to regulation 
by congressional legislation." 273 U.S. at 178. 
176. See Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United 
States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); Boyd 
v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 790 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 
630 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
177. Compare United States v. Morgan, 222 U.S. 274 (1911), with Powell v. 
Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 906 (1966). 
178. Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 458 (1869). The uncertainty 
of the courts is manifested in cases addressing the question whether a United States 
Attorney has the prerogative to decline or to drop prosecution for a federal offense. 
In answering in the affirmative, several courts have both adverted to the doctrine 
that prosecutorial discretion is an inherent power of the Executive and have looked 
to the statute defining the offense for an indication that Congress intended to allow 
the Executive discretion on whether to prosecute. See Boyd v. United States, 345 
F. Supp. 790 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Moses v. Kennedy, 219 F. Supp. 762 (D.D.C. 1963). 
See also Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d 
Cir. 1973), where the Second Circuit explained that a prosecutor's decision not 
to prosecute is not subject to judicial review because, "[i]n the absence of statutorily 
defined standards governing reviewability, or regulatory or statutory policies of prose-
cution, the problems inherent in the task of supervising prosecutorial decisions do 
not lend themselves to resolution by the judiciary." 477 F.2d at 380. The court 
rejected the argument that Congress withdrew the normal prosecutorial discretion 
on prosecutions for violations of a person's civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1987 
(1970) by providing that United States Attorneys are "authorized and required" 
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of faithful execution means simply that the Executive must carry out 
the laws as directed by Congress,179 the assertion that Congress can 
exact from the Executive unflinching adherence to its will in the -
"execution of the laws" contravenes persuasive authority construing 
the separation of powers implicit in the Constitution. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the Constitution creates 
a sphere of exclusive executive authority. In Kendall v. United 
States ex rel. Stokes, 180 a leading case sustaining the power of a court 
to compel an executive official to comply with a statutory command, 
the Court emphasized that "[t]he mandamus does not seek to direct 
or control the postmaster general in the discharge of any offici&l 
duty, partaking in any respect of an executive character; but to en-
force the performance of a mere ministerial act, which neither he 
nor the President had any authority to deny or control."181 It has 
been argued that whether a responsibility is "ministerial" or "discre-
tionary" is a matter of congressional design, 182 but the Court in Ken-
dall recognized a distinction between the performance of constitu-
tional responsibilities of the Executive and the implementation of 
congressional decisions on matters within the authority of Congress. 
When the power exercised resides wholly in Congress, the official 
designated to perform the action is an agent of Congress and is thus 
obligated to follow its instructions.188 When the Executive acts pur-
to institute prosecution. 477 F.2d at 381. However, the court expressly left open 
the question whether a court could command prosecution if Congress explicitly de-
nied the prosecutor any discretion. 477 F.2d at 382. 
179. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 604 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974), in which the court stated that the "constitutional duty [of the President 
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed] does not permit the President 
to refrain from executing laws duly enacted by the Congress as those laws are 
construed by the judiciary." This case involved a statute directing the President 
to approve a salary schedule for certain federal employees. 
180. 37 U.S. ( 12 Pet.) 524 (1838). The issue in Kendall was whether the federal 
courts could issue a writ of mandamus directing the Postmaster General to credit the 
account of a contractor who had performed services for the post office in an amount 
determined by the Solicitor of the Treasury. 
181. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 610 (emphasis added). 
182. Note, Discretion To Prosecute Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 14 YALE L.J. 
1297, 1305 (1965). A duty is ministerial, the argument goes, if the statute giving 
rise to it is so detailed and categorical that it precludes deviation from its terms. 
See Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206, 218-19 (1930): 
Where an administrative duty imposed by statute on an executive officer is 
so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt and equivalent to a positive 
command it is regarded as being so far ministerial that its performance may 
be compelled by mandamus, unless there be provision or implication to tpe 
contrary. 
There is language in Kendall supporting this approach. In the Court's reading of 
tho statute, "[t]here is no room for the exercise of any discretion, official or other-
wise: all that is shut out by the direct and positive command of the law, and 
the act required to be done is, in every just sense, a mere ministerial act." 37 
U.S. (12 Pet.) at 613. 
183. E.g., the power to dispose of monetary claims lodged against the govern-
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suant to constitutional authority, it enjoys an immunity to congres-
sional control.184 This doctrine that the Constitution demarcates a 
zone of exclusive executive responsibility can be traced to Marbury 
v. Madison185 and has received contemporary reaffirmation in Myers 
v. United States186 and United States v. Nixon.187 
Further support for this doctrine is found in The Federalist 
Papers. These writings clearly evince the understanding of the 
framers that the Constitution endows the Executive with a certain 
autonomy protected from congressional infringement. Madison 
recognized that the prophylactic value of the dispersal of powers 
within the federal government would be vitiated if one branch could 
exert plenary control over another.188 In the minds of the Fed-
eralists, neither the terms of the Constitution itself nor the electoral 
process could be relied upon to suppress the animus of one branch-
especially the legislature-to infringe upon and usurp the powers of 
another.189 Rather, in order to protect the separation of powers they 
looked to "the interior structure of the government" in which "those 
ment. See 37 U.S. at 611; State Highway Commn. v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1111 
(8th Cir. 1973). 
184. As stated in Kendall, "The executive power is vested in a President: and 
as far as his powers are derived from the constitution, he is beyond the reach of 
any other department, except in the mode prescribed by the constitution through 
the impeaching power." 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 610. On the other hand, the Court 
also asserted that the contention "that the obligation imposed on the President to 
see the laws faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid their execution, is a 
novel construction of the constitution, and entirely inadmissible." 37 U.S. (12 Pet,) 
at 613. In this case the President had not attempted to shield the Postmaster General 
but, in fact, had left him to his own devices. 
185. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Chief Justice Marshall observed that "[b]y 
the constitution of the United States, the president is invested with certain impor-
tant political powers in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and 
is accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own charac-
ter." 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 165-66. 
186. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). In the words of Chief Justice Taft, when the Presi-
dent discharges his "political" executive power, "the discretion to be exercised is 
that of the President in determining the national public interest and in directing 
the action to be taken by his executive subordinates to protect it." 272 U.S. at 
134. See also Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610 
(1838): "There are certain political duties imposed upon many officers in the execu-
tive department, the discharge of which is under the direction of the President," 
187. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). Although the Court denied the privilege claimed 
by the Executive in this case, the Court reiterated that each branch is supreme 
"within its own assigned area of constitutional duties. Certain powers and privilege 
flow from the nature of enumerated powers." 418 U.S. at 705. 
188. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison): 
[I]t is agreed on all sides, that the powers properly belonging to one of the 
departments ought not to be directly and completely administered by either 
of the other departments. It is equally evident, that none of them ought to 
possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others, in the 
administration of their respective powers. 
Id. at 332. 
189. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (J. Madison), No. 49 (J, Madison), No, SO 
(J. Madison), No. 51 (J. Madison). 
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who administer each department [.are] given the necessary constitu-
tional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the 
others."100 Although devices such as the veto power may have been 
foremost in the minds of these commentators, their concern for 
maintaining truly independent centers of governmental power de-
mands that each branch have autonomous powers to develop policy 
within the confines of the respective spheres. Consequently, by con-
ferring the power to execute the laws upon the Executive, the Con-
stitution impliedly bars Congress both from redistributing wholesale 
this power to nonexecutive agencies and from denying the Executive 
its prerogative to impart its policy choices upon the conduct of the 
government's litigation. 191 
The framers of the Constitution did not, of course, intend for 
mutual suspicions to dominate relations among the departments of 
the government; effective government requires cooperative exercise 
of complementary powers.192 Much of the ambiguity in the Solicitor 
General's position has its source in the faithful execution clause, 
which both directs the Executive to administer faithfully legitimate 
legislative and judicial decisions and creates a realm in which the 
Executive exerts original policy influence. As a result, the Solicitor 
General normally pursues ·the interests of a unified government, but 
he maintains the freedom, as an agent of the Executive, to make an 
independent formulation of governmental policy. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Solicitor General's role has dramatically expanded since the 
establishment of the office in 1870. Originally viewed as a mere 
assistant to the Attorney General, the Solicitor General now bears 
primary responsibility for representing the United States in the Su-
preme Court, whereas the Attorney General's office has evolved 
into an administrative and political position. Along with this en-
hanced responsibility, the Solicitor General has acquired a sizeable de-
gree of autonomy and a reputation for enlightened representation 
of the interests of the United States. · 
190. THE FEDERALIST No. S1, at 347, 349 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison). 
191. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. S2, 134 (1926). See also United 
States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 93S (1965): "The 
executive is charged with caaying out national policy on law-enforcement." 342 
F.2d at 193 (Wisdom, J., concurring specially). 
192. As Justice Jackson observed in the Steel Seizure Case, Youngstown Sheet 
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. S79 (1952), "[w]hile the Constitution diffuses 
power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate 
the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches 
separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." 343 U.S. at 63S (Jack-
son, J., concurring). 
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The practice of the Solicitor General does not wholly accord with 
his image as an advocate beholden only to his understanding of the 
law and public policy. Ultimately, he serves the President. Further-
more, insofar as he does exercise independent judgment, his authority 
is not easily reconciled with the separation of powers. Yet, the dis-
crepancy between the Solicitor General's perceived role and his actual 
conduct is not necessarily troublesome. By and large, the Solicitor 
General has properly resolved conflicts among his "public" and in-
stitutional responsibilities. Moreover, most of those with an interest 
in the Solicitor General's work have respected his authority despite, 
or perhaps because of, the ambiguous nature of his role. These de-
velopments demonstrate the extent to which historical practice has 
conferred legitimacy on certain powers of the Solicitor General that 
are not easily derived from any statutory or constitutional rule. 
Furthermore, they demonstrate our confidence that informal under-
standings of the guiding principles of legitimate conduct will prevent 
abuse of those powers. 
